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Many people smile at that popular T-shirt slogan from Shakespeare:
"First, let's kill all the lawyers."' Its message and the accompanying smile illus-
trate the hostility many Americans feel towards the legal profession.' However,
* Associate Professor of Law. Albany Law School. The author wishes to express her appreciation to Dean
Martin Belsky and Professors Steven J. Burton. Robert Begg. Edward Gordon. Stephen Gottlieb, W. William
Hodes. Kenneth Kress, Sanford Levinson, Richard Matasar, Bonnie Steinbock. Kathleen Waits and Elizabeth
Warren; also to Sam Stier for comments on the manuscript.
I. W. SHAKESPEARE. KING HENRY VI. PART II. act IV. scene II, at line 86.
2. This hostility is dramatized by popular jokes like: "Question: Why did the research scientist substitute
lawyers for rats in his laboratory experiments? Answer. Lawyers breed more rapidly, scientists become less at-
tached to them. and there are some things that rats just won't do." Post. On The Popular Image Of The Lawyer:
Rellections In A Dark Glass. 75 CALIF. L. REV. 379. 379 (1987). The history of expressions of such negative
feelings is of long standing. Post begins the tale of the genre with St. Luke in the New Testament: "Woe unto you
also. ye lawyers! for ye lade men with burdens grievous to be borne .... " Id. at 379 (quoting Luke 11:46). See
also L. FRIEDMAN. A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 94-96. 303-04; A. ROTH & J. ROTH, DEVIL'S ADVOCATES:
TiE UNNATURAl HISTORY OF LAWYERS (1989). "Comments about lawyers in the Bible. in fourteenth- and six-
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Shakespeare's words, when placed in context, relate the intent of conspirators to
take over the state and get rid of those who might protect the peace and the law
of the land-the lawyers.
3
Our society loves to hate lawyers. Yet, at the same time, there is a deep
respect for the rule of law and, thus, a need for those who administer it.4 Much
of the ambivalence about lawyers reflects a more general ambivalence about the
adversary system of justice. On the one hand, imagining ourselves as defendants
in a criminal trial, we want to be represented by the toughest, roughest,
smartest attorney we can find. On the other hand, hearing horror stories of rape
victims being torn to shreds on the witness stand, of obstetricians giving up their
practices because of the claimed impact of malpractice actions brought against
them, and of divorcing couples continuing to fight for years after their dissolu-
tion, we wonder if adversary justice and the lawyers who provide it simply cost
too much.
teenth-century England, in Renaissance Europe, and in America from the colonial period down to the present
show a remarkably constant picture: a mixture of honorable distinction and popular dislike." Mindes & Acock,
Trickster. Hero, Helper: A Report on the Lawyer Inzage, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 177, 184 (footnote omit-
ted). Recently. President Bush's press secretary waS asked the meaning of the reference in the President's latest
speech promising government help "to restore common sense and fairness to America's medical malpractice sys-
tem." Press Secretary Fitzwater declared: "Lawyers certainly deserve all the criticism they can get .... Those
are universally held feelings by everyone who has ever dealt with the legal establishment." The Times Union
(Albany). Feb. 24, 1990, at A-2.
3. Shakespeare's King Henry VI. Part IH relates the tale of Henry the VI's marriage to Margaret of Anjou.
daughter of the king of Naples in the midst of the rivalries between the houses of York and Lancaster, known as
the "War of the Roses." Richard, Duke of York, pretender to the English throne, stirs up Jack Cade to rebellion
in Act IV. In Scene I!, the conspirators meet on Blackheath, their talk filled with examples of class rivalries.
Conspirator John Holland complains: "The nobility think scorn to go in leather aprons .... [Ylet it is said,
'Labour in thy vocation:' which is as much to say as, let the magistrates be labouring men; and therefore should
we be magistrates." George Bevis replies: "Thou has hit it; for there's no better sign of a brave mind than a hard
hand." W. SHAKESPEARE, supra note I, at lines 14-23. Jack Cade and Dick the butcher and "infinite numbers" of
others now appear. Cade promises to reform England: "All the realm shall be in common . . .[T]hcre shall be no
money: all shall eat and drink on my score; and I will apparel them all in one livery, that they may agree like
brothers, and worship me their lord." To which Dick replies: "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."
Cade responds: "[Tlhat, I mean to do. Is not this a lamentable thing, that of the skin of an innocent lamb should
be made parchment? That parchment, being scribbled o'er should undo a man? ... I did but seal once to a thing,
and I was never mine own man since .... - Id. at lines 77-94.
4. If lawyers were an evil, they were, however, a necessary evil. Only in the very beginning could the
colonies even try to make do without lawyers . . . . But as soon as a settled society posed problems for
which lawyers had an answer, or at least, a skill, the lawyers appeared in force, and flourished despite
animosity.
L. FRitIDMAN, supra note 2. at 85-86.
Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals points out:
The age-old disapproval of members of the bar, and its fashionable contemporary counterpart, obscure the
benefits lawyers produce. Attorneys encounter society's most complex economic problems, its thorniest
social and political issues and its thousands of criminals, victims and disputants. The lawyer must confront
the most virtuous and most malevolent aspects of our community, and attempt to bring order and disci-
pline out of the chaos of human affairs. My years as a lawyer and a judge have all but inured me to the.
criticism leveled at the profession. My experience has proved the validity of Abraham Lincoln's observa-
tion that 'as a peace-maker, the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man.' In a world of
contentious human beings, a community without lawyers would be far from Utopia.
N.Y. Times. Aug. 14, 1983, at A-19.
LEGAL ETHICS
In recent years, a number of legal scholars have taken a critical look at this
adversary model and its premises. 5 They contrast the role assigned to lawyers as
relentless advocates for their clients with the obligations we all have as citizens
to promote fairness and justice. Finding the two incompatible, they label the
incompatibility "role-differentiation." Role-differentiation signifies that the ethi-
cal obligations one undertakes as a lawyer are distinct from and supersede the
ethical obligations one is under in one's non-professional everyday life. Role-
differentiation is widely assumed whether it is regarded positively or negatively.
Thus, one group of commentators, led by Professor.Monroe Freedman,' has no
difficulty defending a sharp distinction between legal and other ethics. Another
group, the "role-differentiation critics," claim that "the standard conception of
a lawyer's role ' 7 makes it impossible to be both a good person and a good law-
yer. They ascribe this disjunction to the ethical standards of the legal profession
itself and advocate radical revisions to the lawyer's role.8
Few have criticized the role-differentiation assumption, 9 and no one has yet
successfully refuted it. Many practicing lawyers accept this "standard concep-
tion" as requiring them regularly to separate their professional actions from
their personal values. The prevailing scholarship in legal ethics does not chal-
lenge them. Many law teachers, particularly those responsible for teaching legal
ethics, 10 also socialize students to treat role-differentiation as the inevitable con-
sequence of adopting a professional ethic. Ironically, even critics of role-differ-
entiation thus reinforce the view that the law's professional standards prescribe
a role morality for lawyers distinct from the common morality that guides all
persons in their daily lives. However well intentioned, their work maintains that
a great divide exists between being a good person and being a good lawyer.
5. See, e.g.. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975); D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988) [hereinafter LAWYERS AND JUSTICE]; Shaffer, The Unique. Novel, and Un-
sound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988).
6. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 5.
7. The phrase seems to have been proposed by the philosopher Gerald Postema. Postema. Moral Responsi-
bilitv in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 63, 73 (1980) [hereinafter Postema 1980]. It is adopted by the
legal philosopher David Luban in his book, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5, at xiv-xv.
8. See, e.g., LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5, App. I at 393. The appendix seeks to demonstrate "that
the standard conception-the principles of partisanship and nonaccountability-accurately represents leading
themes in the official rules or the American legal profession. I believe that it does, and that this is so regardless of
whether the lawyer is in a courtroom, or advocacy. setting." Id. at 393.
9. But see, e.g.. Ellmann, Lawyeringfor Justice in a Flawed Democracy (Book Review of D. LUBAN, LAW-
YERS AND JUSTICE). 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1990); Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Pepper. The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense. A
Problem, and Sonte Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 613; Schneyer, Moral Philosophys Standard
Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 WIs. L. REv. 1529.
10. See. e.g.. G. HAZARD AND S. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 17-31 (1990) [hereinafter
HAZARD & KONIAK]; J. SUTTON AND J. DZIENKOWSKI. TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS 32 (1990); THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSI-
BILITY AND REGULATION 142-71 (Hazard & Rhode eds. 1985). An all day workshop on teaching professional
responsibility at the 1990 convention of the Association of American Law Schools included presentations by
Professors Luban. Menkel-Meadow. Schneyer and Simon emphasizing role-differentiation issues. Teaching Legal
Ethics: A Symniposiumn. 41 J. Leg. Educ. (Mar. 1991).
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Accordingly, their attempts to "reform" the lawyering process end up rejecting
professionalism."
This article contests the role-differentiation approach to legal ethics. If one
were to print a T-shirt slogan expressing its thesis, it would be: "Good lawyers
must be good persons." It will be argued that the so-called "standard concep-
tion of the lawyer's role" in fact is not standard at all. Surely, some lawyers do
bad, even evil, acts in the name of lawyering. But to characterize the basic
framework of the profession itself as promoting and protecting such behavior is
simply mistaken.
Instead, this Article proposes the integrity thesis, which provides a better
reading of the law of lawyering and hence a better interpretation of what con-
stitutes the standard conception of lawyering. Lawyering, like living, often re-
quires making difficult choices among important, competing values. To assist
attorneys in making ethical decisions the standards mandate some choices based
on the thoughtful experience of attorneys particularly concerned with the ethics
of the profession. According to what will be called "the Normativity Principle,"
lawyers have a special obligation to obey the law of lawyering when the rules
are mandatory. The law of lawyering also encourages lawyers to exercise discre-
tion and to choose actions consistent with their own moral values. The integrity
thesis offers a theory of how to exercise this discretion properly. Moreover,
while role-differentiation critics seek to make lawyers accountable for the mo-
rality of their clients' acts, this article instead proposes "the Boundaries Princi-
ple," to explain why this approach is morally wrong. The role-differentiation
thesis reads the professional standards in their worst possible light. The integ-
rity thesis reframes the professional perspective and demonstrates its possibili-
ties for integrating one's cherished personal values with one's obligations as an
attorney.
I. THE ROLE-DIFFERENTIATION THESIS
The role-differentiation thesis claims that the requirements of the profes-
sional role force lawyers to regularly make ethical choices in their legal capacity
that they would not make otherwise. Critics of role-differentiation claim that
the "standard conception of lawyering" required by the law of lawyering de-
mands that attorneys practice role-differentiation. They argue that the conven-
tional requirements of the professional role sharply distinguish between an at-
torney's moral obligations as a person and his or her moral obligations as a
II. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rtv. 29
[hereinafter Simon 19781. A decade later, while affirming general support for his earlier article, Simon acknowl-
edged he -was mistaken to argue in an earlier article that the critique of conventional advocacy presented there
required abandoning the lawyer's professional role." Simon. Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. Rtv.
1083, 1084 n.1 (1988) [hereinafter Simon 1988]. As will be seen below, however. infra notes 31-33. very little
support is given professionalism as conceived by the profession itself by the later article. Luban's 1988 book,




lawyer, privileging 12 the latter. 3  The "standard conception of the lawyer's
role" '14 thus functions to prevent integration of self and role. For example, some
argue that individuals personally committed to truthfulness, frankness, and fair
dealing in their everyday interactions may be required by their professional ob-
ligations when negotiating on a client's behalf to engage in what is euphemisti-
cally called "puffing" and other forms of "white lies."' 5 Lawyers thus cannot be
persons of integrity"8 because they must choose between either being a good
person or a good lawyer.' 7
The literature criticizing role-differentiation contains two arguments to
support the views both that lawyers are required to practice role-differentiation
by their professional obligations and that these requirements generally prevent
attorneys from being both good lawyers and good persons at the same time.
They are the argument from moral nonaccountability and the argument from
partisanship. Part I of this Article will take up each of these arguments and
rebut each one in turn. Underlying both of these arguments is a mistaken juris-
prudence, which will be termed the argument from positivism. Part II will pre-
sent this argument and its refutation. Part III will offer an alternative view of
lawyering and ethics-the integrity thesis.
A. Moral Nonaccountability
According to the role-differentiation thesis, the "standard conception of
lawyering," as memorialized in the ethical guidelines of the profession, posits a
total separation between personal morality and the law of lawyering. The most
serious consequence of this separation of law and morals is that lawyers are not
held morally responsible for the actions they take on behalf of their clients.
Critics of role-differentiation generally refer to this aspect of the standard con-
12. The concept of "privileging" conveys the idea that a particular point of view, value, or argument isn't
merely preferable to others but displaces, dominates, and trumps all others. See, e.g., Stier. Privileging Empiri-
cisn in Legal Dialogue: Death and Dangerousness, 21 U. C. DAVIS L. REv. 271 (1988).
13. Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. I (1975) [hereinafter
Wasserstrom].
14. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
15. See. e.g.. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation. 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. Rss. J. 926.
16. Postema claims that integrity of personality "is not possible under the present conception of the lawyer's
role, as exemplified by the Code of Professional Responsibility." Postema 1980, supra note 7, at 64.
17. Luban contributed to and edited a book, The Good Lawyer, examining the question of whether good
lawyers can be good persons. In a later book of his own. Luban juxtaposes role morality and common morality to
make this point and claims that the role morality required by the "standard conception" is sometimes inconsistent
with the common morality required of good persons. "[T]he fundamental complaint is that a role morality such as
the standard conception amounts simply to an institutionalized immunity from the requirements of conscience."
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE. supra note 5, at xxi. The question is asked: Can a good lawyer be a good person? in G.
BI LOWS & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERINO PROcrss: NEGOTIATION 288 (1981). Postema writes:
[lt is not possible to separate questions regarding the proper responsibilities of a lawyer ("What is in-
volved in being a good lawyer?") from the sorts of questions persons considering lawyering as a career
might ask themselves (including. for example. "Can a good person be a good lawyer?")
Sometimes with discomfort, sometimes with pride, lawyers acknowledge that the legal profession per-
mits or requires actions that would draw moral censure if performed by others.
Postema. Self-Image. Integrity, and Professional Responsibility, 286. 287-88, in THE GOOD LAWYER (D.
Luban ed. 1983) [hereinafter Postema 1983]. See also, Simon 1978. supra note II; Wasserstrom, supra note 13.
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ception of lawyering as the "principle of moral nonaccountability."18 The role-
differentiation criticism of the moral neutrality of lawyers is presented below as
the argument from moral nonaccountability. This argument is central to the
critics' theory of what constitutes the profession's "standard conception of lawy-
ering." There follows a refutation of the critics' claim that in order to be per-
sons of integrity, lawyers should be required by their professional standards to
be morally accountable for their clients' goals.
1. The Argument from Moral Nonaccountability
Role-differentiation critics characterize lawyers as mere legal technicians
who assist clients to achieve their goals regardless of the content of those goals
and using whatever lawful means are required."9 Lawyers, therefore, do not act
on the basis of moral considerations that attach to them as independent persons.
In his seminal 1975 article, the philosopher Richard Wasserstrom suggests:
"[I]t is the nature of role-differentiated behavior that it often makes it both
appropriate and desirable for the person in a particular role to put to one side
considerations of various sorts-and especially various moral considera-
tions-that would otherwise be relevant if not decisive."' 0 Wasserstrom made
two major criticisms of lawyering based on such behavior. First, he claimed that
lawyers as professionals may be forced by the demands of the lawyer-client re-
lationship to be "at best systematically amoral and at worst more than occasion-
ally immoral in [their] dealings with the rest of mankind."' 1 Second, the "law-
yer-client relationship . . . is morally objectionable because it is a relationship
in which the lawyer dominates and in which the lawyer typically, and perhaps
inevitably, treats the client in both an impersonal and a paternalistic fashion." 21
Role-differentiation critics argue that the amorality, or even immorality, of law-
yers is a function of "the standard conception" of lawyering which wrongly re-
quires lawyers not to be morally accountable for their clients' goals.
For example, in deciding whether or not to take on a particular representa-
tion, Wasserstrom claims that lawyers should, but do not, properly evaluate the
goals of such a representation:
Suppose that a client desires to make a will disinheriting her children because they
opposed the war in Vietnam. Should the lawyer refuse to draft the will because the
lawyer thinks this is a bad reason to disinherit one's children? Suppose a client can
avoid the payment of taxes through a loophole only available to a few wealthy taxpay-
18. Luban notes that the label "principle of nonaccountability" comes from Murray L. Schwartz who writes:
"When acting as an advocate for a client ... a lawyer is neither legally, professionally, nor morally accountable
for the means used or the ends achieved." Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66
CALIF. L. REV. 669, 673 (1978), reprinted in LAWYERS AND JUSTICE. supra note 5, at 7.
19. Postema 1980, supra note 7, at 80.
20. Wasserstrom, supra note 13, at 3.
21. Id. at I. Wasserstrom distinguishes the professional role from that of one's moral obligations in general
by asserting: "[W]here the attorney-client relationship exists, it is often appropriate and many times even obliga-
tory for the attorney to do things that, all other things being equal, an ordinary person need not, and should not
do." Id. at 5.
22. Id. at I. Ironically, as will be seen below in the discussion of the integrity thesis and the Boundaries
Principle, the very paternalism criticized in this second objection is encouraged by the proposed remedy of moral
accountability.
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ers. Should the lawyer refuse to tell the client of a loophole because the lawyer thinks
it an unfair advantage for the rich? Suppose a client wants to start a corporation that
will manufacture, distribute and promote a harmful but not illegal substance, e.g.,
cigarettes. Should the lawyer refuse to prepare the articles of incorporation for the
corporation? 23
Critics of role-differentiation understand such neutrality to have a number
of negative consequences. First, according to the role-differentiation thesis, it is
not possible for attorneys to be both good persons and good lawyers within the
"ideology of advocacy. '24 Lawyers have to divide themselves into separate be-
ings. One is a person who is guided by the requirements of common morality.
25
The other is a lawyer who is guided solely by role morality.26 The need to jus-
tify one's actions by different standards, depending upon whether or not one is
functioning as a lawyer, necessitates engaging in compartmentalization. The
different parts of one's self that wind up in the resulting compartments may not
function coherently with one another from a moral point of view. This division
destroys one's integrity as a person.2 7
Second, the requirements of the lawyer's role force attorneys to perform
solely as legal agents, never as moral agents, in their client representation.
Thus, lawyers are cut off from their own moral values in working with clients.
The role-differentiation critic, Gerald Postema, emphasizes that such moral
neutrality forces lawyers to adopt a "strategy of detachment" that:
yields a severe impoverishment of moral experience. . . . Since the characteristic
activities of the lawyer require a large investment of his moral faculties, the lawyer
must reconcile himself to a kind of moral prostitution. . . . [He] is alienated from
his own moral feelings and attitudes and indeed from his moral personality as a
whole. 8
Third, attorneys are not accountable for the moral harms to third parties or
to society that result from their client representation. Because of moral nonac-
countability, lawyers presently are not morally responsible for what may happen
to the children of the testators who disinherit them because of their political
activities or to those who become ill from smoking cigarettes or to the general
society for the reduction in public funds that may result from tax incentives
built into the tax code.
23. Wasserstrom. supra note 13. at 7-8.
24. Simon 1978. supra note II. See infra discussion at notes 31-33.
25. The term -common morality" is used generally by the role-differentiation critics without much explica-
tion. It is adopted here to represent both conventional morality, the norms generally agreed to as morally right by
a particular culture, and critical morality, that which is right independent of any recognition by any cultural
group. For our purposes, we need not go any further than this into a very complicated philosophical issue.
26. Luban explains that role-differentiation depends on a:
theory of role morality [that] takes off from a distinction between universal moral duties that bind us all
because we are all moral agents and special duties that go with various social roles ... [so that] conflicts
sometimes arise between "common morality" and "role morality." When such conflicts arise, the theory
asserts that role morality must take precedence. This notion ... explains how people in certain social roles
may be morally required to do things that seem immoral.
LAW' ERS AND JUSTItCE. supra note 5. at xx.
27. Postema 1983. supra note 17, at 286.
28. Postema 1980, supra note 7, at 78-79. Postema is the role-differentiation theorist who has most exten-
sively addressed the issue of integrity.
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Role-differentiation critics disparage moral nonaccountability and would
have lawyering guided otherwise. For example, Luban would replace the princi-
ple of moral nonaccountability with "lawyering with accountability" or "moral
activism." He has "a vision of law practice in which the lawyer who disagrees
with the morality or justice of a client's ends does not simply terminate the
relationship, but tries to influence the client for the better."29 Simon envisions
an alternative to morally neutral lawyering, which he calls "non-professional
advocacy," which will "increase the client's concern for the impact of his con-
duct on others." 30
Perhaps Simon goes the furthest in his criticism of moral neutrality, which
he attributes to professionalism itself. He defines professionalism "as the notion
that the law is an apolitical and specialized discipline and that its proper devel-
opment and application require that legal ethics be elaborated collectively by
lawyers in accordance with criteria derived from their discipline. '3' For Simon,
29. LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 160. There are two instances in which Luban would not hold a
lawyer morally responsible for a client's ends and yet would provide representation. These would involve situations
in which the lawyer acts on behalf of a principle like free speech. An example is the ACLU's representation or the
Nazis or of pornographers. Another is acting as a lawyer "for the damned." This is a lawyer "who takes on those
cases that no one else will come near, cases in which the client has for one reason or another rightly become
odious or untouchable in the eyes of mankind." Id. at 162. The new version of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility recently adopted in New York urges lawyers to represent unpopular clients by adopting the position that
"'[a] lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorse-
ment of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities." 14 THE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESI'ONSIBIUTY EC 2-27 (New York State Bar Association, 1990). Luban really can't have it both ways.
30. Simon 1978, supra note II, at 133. Simon describes his 1988 article as "an elaboration of what I previ-
ously called 'non-professional advocacy.' " Simon 1988. supra note II, at 1084 n.l. Luban's alternative view of
morally accountable lawycring would forbid "modes of practice that inflict morally unjustifiable damage on other
people, especially innocent people." LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 157. Simon's later elaboration makes
the claim that the standards of the profession provide either categorical norms or what he terms "private norms"
which "connote standardlessness and nonreviewability." Simon 1988, supra note I1, at 1090. The invalidity of this
caricature will be demonstrated below in the discussion of the integrity thesis in Section II1. Simon proposes that
lawyers should have ethical discretion, as a matter of legal rather than moral obligation, to nullify certain profes-
sional obligations like maintaining confidentiality. After weighing all the factors that bear on the legal merit, the
lawyer determines whether the substantive purpose would be better served by some other action. As will be seen
below, the major strength of the article, its elaboration of what properly goes into the process of determining an
ethical action, can be usefully subsumed under the integrity thesis' reasons for action analysis, infra at notes 220-
35.
31. Simon 1978, supra note I1, at 133. This is a definition devoid of any recognition or support for the value
of the concept of professionalism, however. Contra the impassioned dissent or Supreme Court Justice O'Connor:
One distinguishing feature of any profession, unlike other occupations that may be equally respectable, is
that membership entails an ethical obligation to temper one's selfish pursuit of economic success by adher-
ing to standards of conduct that could not be enforced either by legal fiat or through the discipline of the
market. There are sound reasons to continue pursuing the goal that is implicit in the traditional view of
professional life. Both the special privileges incident to membership in the profession and the advantages
those privileges give in the necessary task of earning a living are means to a goal that transcends the
accumulation of wealth. That goal is public service, which in the legal profession can take a variety of
familiar forms. This view of the legal profession need not be rooted in romanticism or self-serving sancti-
mony, though of course it can be. Rather, special ethical standards for lawyers are properly understood as
an appropriate means of restraining lawyers in the exercise of the unique power that they inevitably wield
in a political system like ours.
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 486 U.S. 466, 488-89 (1988) (O'Connor dissented from the Court's holding
that lawyers' solicitation of legal business for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to
potential clients known to face particular legal problems is protected speech under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments). For a view of professionalism that emphasizes its integration with self, see Kronman, Living in the Law,
54 U. Cmn. L. REV. 835 (1987).
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professionalism requires lawyers to rely exclusively on legal rules rather than
morality (understood as personal or social norms) when, as lawyers, they make
ethical decisions. Instead, Simon believes lawyering should be guided by "non-
professional advocacy." He argues that lawyers should function solely on the
basis of their individual convictions in determining what ethical choices to
make. The non-professional advocate should be directed exclusively by personal
ethics, and the legal relationship requires that "advocate and client must each
justify himself to the other. This justification need not embrace the person's
entire life, but merely those aspects of it which bear on the dispute. ' 32 Thus,
Simon rejects the use of decisions of a professional collectivity, memorialized in
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct,33 in framing appropriate standards for an individual to use in
making professional ethical judgments.
[Tihe very notion of a profession-as distinguished from a mere technique-implies the possession of
certain character-defining traits or qualities . [.. iThe dispositional habits which the practice of law both
requires and encourages have a bearing not only on what a person can do (like the habit, say, of touch-
typing) but on who he or she is as well (like the habits of generosity and temperance).
Id. at 841 (footnote omitted).
32. Simon 1978, supra note II. at 133.
[Non-professional advocacy would] require that every moral decision be made by the individual himselr;
no institution can define his obligations in advance. . . . [T]he individual may be called upon to answer
for his decisions by any other individual who is affected by them. No specialized group has a monopoly
which disqualifies outsiders from criticizing the behavior of its members. Second, personal ethics require
that individuals take responsibility for the consequences of their decisions. . . . The non-professional advo-
cate presents himself to a prospective client as someone with special talents and knowledge, but also with
personal ends to which he is strongly committed .... If the two sets of ends coincide, then a strong
alliance on behalf of these ends is possible. If the two sets or ends are irreconcilably opposed, then no
relationship will be possible.
Id. at 131-32.
The critique of the argument from moral nonaccountability appears below, but a few specific comments to
the particulars of Simon's position are in order here. "Non-professional advocacy" vitiates the very foundation of
the lawyer-client relationship by making the lawyer accountable to all interested parties. Under these conditions
there can be no loyalty to a client. This is apparently Simon's intent, and it should be made very clear. The idea or
clients and lawyers negotiating over the ends of representation is nothing new. it happens in most representations
every day. However, the instances in which clients have such clearly abhorrent ends and lawyers such clearly
formulated objections are much rarer than Simon's rhetoric would suggest. The official professional standards
clearly recognize the propriety or refusing or terminating representation under these conditions as well as giving
permission for lawyers to try and persuade clients to behave otherwise. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
IOutr Rule 1.16 (1983) [hereinafter RULES] and MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-110
(1980) [hereinafter CODE].
33. "[Elach state's highest court has promulgated a code of behavior for its lawyers. Since 1970. in virtually
every state. this code was based on the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility." T. MORGAN & R.
ROTUNDA. PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 28 (1987).
The Model Code was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 12.
1969. to become effective for ABA members on January 1, 1970. It has been amended several times since.
The current Code replaced the earlier Canons of Professional Ethics, which had been adopted in 1908,
and which in turn had been based on the Alabama State Bar Association's Code of 1887. which had found
its origins in Judge George Sharswood's, A Compend of Lectures on the Aims and Duties of the Profes-
sion of the Law (1854).
Id. at 28 n.*. 'iT]he ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983. It is important to
understand, however, that the 'Model' Code and 'Model' Rules are only models. The code of ethics that governs
the lawyers licensed in a given state are the rules adopted by that state's supreme court." Id. at 28.
[Als of spring 1989. 29 states have adopted all or significant portions of the Model Rules in some form.
(Several states, including New York, Vermont, and Massachusetts, have rejected the Model Rules. Cali-
fornia also has chosen not to adopt the Rules, but has amended its Rules of Professional Conduct to
incorporate some Model Rule provisions. A similar effort is underway in New York.)
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In sum, role-differentiation critics see moral nonaccountability as the cen-
tral harm of "the ideology of advocacy." The moral implications of a clients'
goals are supposed to be irrelevant when lawyers are not held morally accounta-
ble for the ends sought and achieved through their legal representation. Law-
yers perform amoral and even immoral acts for clients that they would not per-
form otherwise. By doing so, attorneys may thus be "good" lawyers, according
to role morality and within the parameters of "the ideology of advocacy," but
they forfeit their integrity which requires acting on the dictates of common mo-
rality. Therefore, these critics claim lawyers cannot be good persons.
2. Critique of the Argument from Moral Nonaccountability
The role-differentiation thesis implies that it is not possible to be both a
good person and a good lawyer because the moral standards for personhood and
lawyerhood are different. Good lawyers may be required to promote client goals
that are morally wrong. Role morality holds lawyers nonaccountable for this
immoral conduct even though common morality condemns it. Thus, good law-
yers cannot function both as good attorneys and remain persons of integrity.
There are two problems with this moral nonaccountability argument. The first
is the fact that role-differentiation critics ask the wrong question. The second is
that the requirement of moral accountability violates a more vital value, the
Boundaries Principle.
The Four Elements Analysis. To ask whether one can be both a good per-
son and a good lawyer is to ask the wrong question. This question itself assumes
an odd disjunction between one's professional and personal lives. In both con-
texts at different times, one plays a multitude of roles-friend, spouse, parent,
legal counselor, advisor, advocate, officer of the court, legal reformer. Role-dif-
ferentiation critics ask if it is possible to play roles that call for different moral
considerations and still remain a person of integrity. A preferable approach to
thinking about ethics provides an analysis based on four elements: (1) persons
who (2) act (3) in circumstances (4) for reasons.34 The first element, agency,
assumes that persons are free moral beings.3 5 The second element, act, focuses
S. GILLERS & R. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS xii (1989). On September I,
1990, New York's modification of the Code went into effect after adoption April 5 by the states four Appellate
Division Departments. Special Supplement. Professional Disciplinary Rules, N.Y.L.J. (May 14. 1990) [hereinaf-
ter Special Suppmenent]. The Code is organized differently from the Rules.
The Ethical Considerations [ECs] are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which
every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer
can rely for guidance in many specific situations. The Disciplinary Rules [DRs], unlike the Ethical Con-
siderations, are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.
S. GILLERS & R. SIMON, supra, at 206 (citing Preliminary Statement, MODEL CODE O1 PROFM IONAL
RESPONSIBILITY).
34. The author is grateful to Professor Steven J. Burton. her spouse, for bringing this analytical framework
to her attention. See S. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH (publication forthcoming).
35. It should be emphasized that in this framework there is a single integrated being who weighs the various
reasons for action derived from her different circumstances. One major reason for action is always one's character,
which provides dispositions to act on certain reasons in all circumstances. See infra text accompanying notes 40-
46. For an understanding of the interaction between character and life, see M. NUSSBAUM, TIlE FRAGILITY OF
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on what actions people might take, not their beliefs. 3' The third element, cir-
cumstances, highlights the importance of the context within which persons act.
Few physical acts are always right or wrong regardless of their circumstances.
And the fourth element, reasons for action, calls for justifications for the actions
that are taken on the basis of appropriate standards of conduct invoked by the
context.
When persons act in circumstances for reasons, the agent examines and
weighs the various reasons for different actions from the point of view of an
actor, not an observer. This is not a distinction between subjective and objective
perspectives. Observers focus on behavior; they describe and explain or predict
it with relative degrees of objectivity or subjectivity. In contrast, the actor un-
derstands what he or she has chosen to do in a fundamentally different way. 37
For example, a parent uses a thermometer, measures his young child's tempera-
ture, finds it registers 101 degrees Fahrenheit, and concludes the child has a
fever. Up to this point the parent has been an observer. The parent shifts to the
perspective of an actor when he considers what to do about it-whether to give
aspirin or a tepid bath. He may decide on the latter because of concern about
the potential harmful effects of aspirin to a young child. In deciding on the best
action, the parent may need to consider a number of reasons for and against a
number of alternatives.
Since both the decision maker and any subsequent evaluator of that deci-
sion will be examining reasons for action, not only behavioral descriptions, ex-
planations and predictions, the centrality of the actor's point of view is particu-
larly important. This is not just a bid for empathy, a plea not to judge before
"walking a thousand miles in the other person's moccasins." There is a signifi-
cant conceptual issue here. A lawyer facing an ethical decision is more like the
parent deciding what to do about the child's fever than observing simply that a
GOODNESS (1986) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM]. For an excellent discussion of character and lawyering, see Kronman.
supra note 31.
36. Practical deliberations involve deciding what I ought to do, that is. what actions I ought to take, under
the particular circumstances before me and given the set of reasons invoked by those circumstances. They do not
involve judgments about what to believe or hypotheses about what might cause me to take any particular action.
Practical deliberations thus depend on the application of practical reason, which is:
the capacity of a human being to act intentionally in various circumstances on reasons for action, notably
norms. It stands in contrast to "scientific" or "theoretical" reason, which concerns the capacity of a
human being to form beliefs about the world based on reasons for beliefs, notably observations. Philoso-
phers of law have treated law as practical reason in this sense intensively since H.L.A. Hart dramatized
the importance of the law as provider of reasons for action, to be understood with respect for the point of
view of participants in a legal practice. Joseph Rax, in particular, is a leading philosopher of law who.
more than any other, has identified and worked out many of the analytical implications of law as practical
reason.
Burton. Law As Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747. 747-48 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
37. The fever example that follows illustrates by means of two syllogisms the difference between theoretical
reason resulting in a belief and practical reason resulting in an act. Theoretical Reason-Step One (pI): tempera-
ture, more than 98.6 degrees signal a fever: Step two (p2): the child's temperature is more than 98.6 degrees- Step
three (conclusion): Therefore. the child has a fever. Practical Reason-Step one (pl): when a child has a fever,
take remedial action; Step two (p2) (the conclusion of the theoretical syllogism): the child has a fever: Step three:
(conclusion): Therefore. take remedial action. The conclusion of the first, theoretical syllogism is a belief while the
conclusion of the second, practical syllogism is action.
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fever exists. A legal reason makes a difference to what a legal actor ought to do;
yet it may escape the observer's notice altogether. 38
The role-differentiation thesis, when it claims role morality vitiates a law-
yer's integrity as a person, mistakenly focuses on the first element of agency.
The thesis claims that someone is a different person when she functions as a
lawyer from when she functions otherwise. This is a basic mistake. The correct
focus should be on the third element-the circumstances. It is the circum-
stances of action, not the persons, that make the difference when persons who
are attorneys perform legal functions.3 9 Under this analysis, persons when act-
ing as lawyers have special duties to their clients which arise just because they
are performing legal rather than other functions. Anyone, when acting as a law-
yer, would have the same duties.4" In the circumstance of representation law-
yers will consider a number of reasons to determine the actions they should
take. The reasons to be considered will be different from the reasons to be con-
sidered for acting in a different context, for example, in the circumstance of
being a parent. 41
38. The distinction was explained by Joseph Raz as follows:
External statements about the law are statements about people's practices and actions, attitudes and be-
liefs concerning the law. Internal statements are those applying the law, using it as a standard by which to
evaluate, guide, or criticize behaviour.... Endorsement of a rule includes, therefore, a disposition to make
internal statements.
J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 154 (1979) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter AUTHORITY].
39. The philosopher Virginia Held also noted this point:
To answer the question whether some roles-namely, "professional" roles-are such that persons in them
may justifiably perform actions that it would be wrong for persons not in those roles to perform. I think
we can best start by seeing the ways in which this formulation of the question is misleading. "Ordinary"
morality addresses itself to the differing circumstances persons find themselves in.
Ordinary morality requires different actions for similar persons in different circumstances. And per-
sons with different abilities should act differently in similar situations. This does not mean that there is a
separate morality for one person as distinct from another, but rather that morality provides that persons in
different circumstances and with different abilities have different obligations.
Held, The Division of Moral Labor and the Role of the Lawyer, in THE GOOD LAWYER 60. 67 (D. Luban ed.
1983).
40. Role morality is incompatible with the requirement that ethical decisions be generalizable or universaliz-
able across persons. Thus, when Martha claims an act she performed was the right thing to do. she can be correct
only if that act would be the right thing for anyone to do under those circumstances. See P. SINGER, GENERALIZA-
TION IN ETHICS (1962).
41. Among ethicists, role-differentiation critics are not alone in mistaking obligations that depend on circum-
stances and reasons as attaching instead to persons universally. For example, Professor Geoffrey Hazard recently
argued against the premise of conventional morality "that there are concrete obligations which every person owes
to every other person." Hazard, My Station As A Lawyer, 6 GA. ST. U.L. REV. I, 7 (1989). Hazard contends:
Universality is assumed to be the essence of ethical norms, their necessary property. This presupposition
necessarily excludes detailed consideration of the particular stations of particular individuals or sets of
individuals. It excludes consideration of whether an actor's station may determine how far he can or
should give effect to universal obligations imposed by the moral codes.
• . .By definition, professional ethics concerns a subset, or norms specifically governing some subset.
of people who have a specific station in life, a particular vocation. These stations include not only those of
lawyers but also those of doctors, public accountants ... and spouses at home.
• . . [Tlhe characteristics of a vocation immediately introduce considerations that are excluded in the
conventional ethical discourse. For example, a distinguishing characteristic of a "lawyer" is that, in the
usual practice setting, the lawyer has a client. The client is a person to whom the lawyer has certain
special responsibilities that are not owed equally to persons who are not the lawyer's clients.
Id. at 13-14.
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One's integrity as a person is not destroyed by distinguishing among the
reasons for action42 in different circumstances. For example, if one is in the
circumstance of being a parent and faced with two drowning children, only one
of whom is one's own child and only one of whom there is time to save from
death, justifying the decision to save one's own child rather than the other child
would not require recourse to anything called role morality.4 3 Parenthood cre-
ates a special set of duties, including special obligations to one's own children in
preference to other children, whose invocation is well supported by the tenets of
common, ordinary, conventional morality. Anyone, in the circumstance of act-
ing as a parent, would have that obligation. If you are a passenger on a train,
there is a train wreck and you escape injury, you have no special obligation to
put yourself at risk and try to save any of the other passengers either legally or
Application of the Four Elements Analysis to Hazard's discussion demonstrates that, by failing to distinguish
between persons and circumstances, he misconceives the universalization requirement in ethics. Universalization
does not, as Hazard supposes, latch onto persons in the abstract. Rather, it latches onto acts that are situated in
real circumstances. Accordingly, all persons are universally obligated to act according to moral principles applica-
ble to all persons in similar circumstances. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 26-72
(L. Beck trans. 1969). Persons are not all obligated to do the same thing regardless of the circumstances. The
reason is that reasons for action are dependent on the circumstances of action. Accordingly, a person who has
made a promise to another, or who represents another as her lawyer, or who holds official office, due to such facts
may have different ethical obligations from those in other situations.
42. The discussion of"reasons for action" in the text is based on the work of Professor H.L.A. Hart, Profes-
sor Joseph Raz and Professor Steven Burton. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88 (1961) [here-
inafter CONCEPT]; J. RAZ. PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1975) [hereinafter PRACTICAL REASON]. Burton.
supra note 34. See extensive discussion of hypothetical demonstrating a reasons for action analysis, infra at Part
III, Section D.
43. From his focus on persons and the different roles they perform, Wasserstrom too would find no difficulty
with preferring the interests of one's own children to those of other children.
[lit could be argued that part of the idea of what it is to be a parent is to prefer the interests of one's own
children over those of other children. If there were no disposition to do so and no roles backing and
reinforcing that disposition, one would have to revise substantially what is in fact meant in social terms by
being a parent.
It could also be claimed, moreover, that I have misdescribed these cases because, for instance, the
interests of one's own children are simply not comparable to those of other children so that it is a mistake
of a different sort to say that the role of parent blocks parents from attending to the welfare of other
children in a morally suspect way. The claims involved are simply not all of the same type. One has a duty
to care for one's own children; there is no duty of the same sort to care for other children. If one is only
being charitable or benevolent if one does attend to the interests of other children, while one is neglecting
one's duty in failing to attend to the interests of one's own children, then there is no reason to think that
one is acting other than morally when one attends to the interests of one's own children as the role of
parent requires.
Wasscrstrom, Roles and Morality. THE GOOD LAWYER 25. 33 (D. Luban ed. 1983).
Apparently the role morality associated with parenthood does not trouble Wasserstrom as does the role mo-
rality associated with lawyering. Yet he makes no argument for distinguishing between the two. Rather there
seems to be an intuitive acceptance of the special duties owed by parents to their own children but no parallel
acceptance of special duties owed by lawyers to their clients. Instead, Wasserstrom argues that proponents of
justifying lawyers' actions on the basis of a role morality founded on special duties to clients shifts "the burden of
argument and proof. . . [to] those who seek to justify the differential consideration and treatment of members of
the moral community that takes place as a result of role-defined reasoning." Id. at 34. Role-differentiation criti-
cism thus imparts a negative connotation to role morality. Of course, the argument from integrity does not adopt
the position that morality can be parsed into common morality and role morality. There is no need to do so when
the ethical discourse is based on a consistent, integrated agent operating in different circumstances that provide
different reasons for action.
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morally.44 But what if you are hired to be a bodyguard for an executive taking
the train, do you have any obligation because of the special circumstance of
your being a bodyguard? You have a special duty to try and save the executive,
even at risk to yourself. But, once again, you have no moral duty to anyone else
on the train. It would be absurd to argue that persons who serve as bodyguards
on trains are different persons while performing that function and that their
actions are justified only by recourse to role morality.45 Anyone, in the circum-
stance of acting as a bodyguard, would have that obligation.
It makes no sense to evaluate the morality of an action in one set of cir-
cumstances by comparing it to another set of circumstances in which the facts
are significantly different. Simply put: A bodyguard, parent, or lawyer should
not act exactly as they should if they weren't in those circumstances. Compar-
ing what one does as a lawyer, and labeling this role morality, to what one
would do if one were not functioning as a lawyer, and labeling this common
morality, is a mistake. The fact of acting as a lawyer makes a moral difference.
The Boundaries Principle. Role-differentiation critics complain that law-
yers do not take moral responsibility for their clients' actions. They would rem-
edy such lawyering by requiring moral activism of attorneys. The direction of a
legal representation would depend on the lawyer's moral compass rather than
that of his or her client. Moreover, lawyers would be held responsible for any
moral harms suffered by third parties or society as a result of their representa-
tion of a client. This aspect of the role-differentiation thesis may be its most
troubling. It violates a far more fundamental principle, one which requires law-
yers to respect the boundary between themselves as independent moral agents
and their clients as independent moral agents.46 The Boundaries Principle, in
contrast, affirms the moral autonomy of both the client and the attorney.
44. It should be noted that both in tort and criminal law, there have been some developments favoring a
greater appreciation of the advantages of a societal norm of good samaritanism. For example. Vermont law
provides:
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can
be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without interference with important duties owed to
others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by
others.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1989) (emphasis added). The emphasis highlights the fact that even the good
samaritan need not put herself at risk. Moreover, those who do not put themselves at risk to assist others would
not be criticized for moral cowardice, either.
45. The truth of this perspective is even indirectly acknowledged by William Simon, but it becomes lost by
his focus on role. Thus, Simon correctly writes that "[plersonal ethics apply to people merely by virtue of the fact
that they are human individuals. The obligations involved may depend on particular circumstances . . . but they
do not follow from social role or station." Simon 1978, supra note 1H. at 131.
46. The following discussion of the Boundaries Principle places special emphasis on the dangers of substitut-
ing the lawyer's moral values for that of his or her client to counter the role-differentiation critics' emphasis on
good lawyering being synonymous with moral activism. However, the problem of respect for client autonomy in
practice is more complicated than this since lawyers often infringe on client autonomy to foster other values such
as efficiency. Professor Elizbeth Warren was kind enough to offer me the following example:
We have an extremely complicated bankruptcy structure. To help a client make a reasoned, autonomous
decision about the choices available in consumer bankruptcy . . . would take about twenty hours of attor-
ney time in a typical case. No debtor in bankruptcy can afford that. Instead, attorneys develop shorthand
routes to decisions and bring an enormous amount of pressure on debtors to 'decide' things consistently
with the attorney's view of how things generally ought to go. Is such an attorney morally reprehensible for
stealing the client's autonomy? Of course, this attorney could develop a largely pro bono practice or send
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Lawyers are morally responsible for their own acts, including their decision
whether or not to represent particular clients and help them achieve their objec-
tives. They are not responsible for their clients' acts. Thus, a lawyer is account-
able for the advice on estate law and family relationships he or she gives a
testator but not the decision of that client to go ahead and disinherit her chil-
dren for opposing the Vietnam war.47 A lawyer is responsible for the decision to
represent a client who wants to file a lawsuit against a cigarette company but
should take no moral pride in the client's decision to sue. Lawyers are morally
responsible for the kinds of arguments and tactics they decide to use on behalf
of a client, but clients are responsible for the morality of the goals those argu-
ments and tactics seek to further.
Moral independence from clients45  permits lawyers to recognize and re-
spect the boundary between themselves as moral beings and their clients as sep-
arate persons with a distinct and equally valid capacity for moral conduct. A
lawyer, within limits, must refrain from judging the morality and determining
the goals sought by a client out of regard for that client's own autonomy as a
moral agent and as an affirmation of the lawyer's own moral independence
within the circumstances of the lawyer-client relationship. Thus, the Rules spe-
cifically provide that a "lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation. . . ."49 Moreover, the permissive structure of many
of the standards that seek to regulate a lawyer's ethical decisions can be under-
stood as reinforcing this proper boundary between lawyer and client in their
professional relationship with one another.
all debtors packing who don't have several thousand dollars to pay the fees, but I don't think those are
realistic solutions. In effect, it seems to me, we have structured the legal system here to usurp client
autonomy.
Letter to the author. August 14, 1990. See also E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK. THE LAW OF DEBTORS & CREDI-
TORS. 392-97. 399.400 (2nd ed. 1991).
This example emphasizes the need to recognize that the Boundaries Principle is not absolute. It can be out-
weighed by other legitimate considerations. Whether an attorney can be faulted morally under these circum-
stances would. I believe, depend on the reasons for limiting the sharing of information for decision with a client.
Professor Warren's example identifies legitimate reasons-consideration for a client's limited resources combined
with a desperate need for assistance-which justify the attorney's balancing of the client's interests. However, if
bankruptcy lawyers were processing clients with no consideration of their particular needs in order simply to
maximize the lawyer's income, such a reason to infringe on client autonomy would not be justified.
47. Schneyer provides an excellent analysis of this example from Wasserstrom in terms illustrative of the
Boundaries Principle when he suggests first that the lawyer has a responsibility to fully discuss with the testator
both the lawyer's concerns and the testator's reasons for disinheriting the son. But if the lawyer then refused to
draft the will "after a full discussion, even though he was convinced that disinheriting the son was proper by the
client's moral rights, I would be inclined to see the refusal as an act of intolerance. .... Schneyer, supra note 9.
at 1563.
48. This is what the role-differentiation critics call the principle of moral nonaccountability. See supra notes
18-33 and accompanying text.
49. Rule 1.2(a) goes on to place authority for deciding on means in the hands of the lawyer. Thus, lawyer
and client have independent responsibilities in shaping the representation. The client determines the purpose to be
achieved, but the lawyer is no mere instrument of the client's wishes. Thus, while DR 7-101, "Representing a
Client Zealously." admonishes at (A)(1) that a lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of
his or her client, it also permits a lawyer to decide to avoid the use of offensive tactics. DR 7-101 (B) reinforces the
view of the lawyer as an independent moral actor by declaring both that a lawyer may exercise his or her own
professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of a client where permitted and to refuse to aid
or participate in conduct the lawyer believes "'to be unlawful, even though there is some support for an argument
that the conduct is legal." CODE, supra note 32, DR 7-101.
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The standards of the profession more directly emphasize the lawyer's au-
tonomy in rules such as that which provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations
such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation. 50
Lawyers promise to represent the client's interests. They hold themselves
out as loyal advocates and thereby induce reliance. They are entrusted with a
client's secrets and fate for limited purposes. To use his or her position as client
confidante and representative as a pretext to advance the lawyer's own moral or
political agenda is to act in bad faith.51 The decision to function as a person in
the circumstance of serving as an attorney means one has decided to forgo that
opportunity. 52
An example from family life may help illustrate how respect for boundaries
serves to re-inforce respect for individual moral autonomy. Your two-year-old
son hits another child and grabs his toy. In these circumstances, you do have a
moral responsibility both to remedy the situation and to teach your child the.
errors of his actions. However, when your twenty-five-year-old son borrows a
friend's car, drives it carelessly, and damages it, you are not responsible, legally
or morally. Your son is now an independent moral agent. If you do take respon-
sibility for his actions, you fail to recognize his independent moral status and
engage in self-aggrandizement in the guise of parental guilt. You overstep the
proper boundary between parent and adult child-a boundary that was gradu-
ally erected as your son grew into adulthood. If you fail to respect this bound-
ary, you deny your son his own separate moral identity.53
A client is an adult, not a child.54 As a practical counselor, 5 lawyers
should respect the boundary between themselves and their clients as indepen-
50. ABA Model Rule 2.1.
51. See. e.g.. the illustrative case of "'Allowing A Personal Agenda to Color Legal Advice," § 2.1: 103 in 1.
G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT. 502 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter HAZARD & HODES].
52. See Burton. Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 369 (1980).
53. Would your moral responsiblity be greater had you assisted your son in borrowing his friend's car-a
situation more analogous to the instrumental role lawyers perform for clients? You would probably feel some
additional regret at your own bad judgment or bad luck, but I do not believe that you are morally responsible for
an unexpected negative outcome just because you rendered some assistance in obtaining the means used to achieve
it. The situation is more troubling if you helped your son borrow a car. knowing he was a poor driver, because you
didn't want to loan him your car. Once again, your reasons for action would be faulty, but your moral errors
would be your own and not those of your son.
54. Even when a client is a child, one who has reached the age of reason, usually around age twelve for legal
purposes such as having a right to be heard about his or her preferences in a custody matter, the child client's
wishes are to be respected by the attorney always when acting as a representative (e.g., law guardian) and even
often when serving as a guardian ad litem, although judgments of "the child's best interest" play a more promi-
nent role when acting in this capacity. See. e.g., the discussion in Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382 (Alaska 1977);
Mlyniec. The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. FAI. L. I
(1977-78).
55. A practical counselor assists clients to decide what they ought to do, what actions they ought to take, in
the particular circumstances before them and by identifying the set of reasons relevant to the action. Such reasons
may include legal, moral, personal, prudential, etc., considerations. Practical counseling also assists clients to
decide how to prioritize or weigh their different reasons for action, though the eventual decision on what to do. the
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dent moral agents. It is their job to help their clients identify the range of rea-
sons for action they should consider in their situation-legal, moral, personal,
and prudential. It is not their job, however, to breach the bounds of their cli-
ents' moral integrity and, directly or indirectly, impose the lawyers' moral pref-
erences on their clients.5 6
Moreover, respecting these boundaries does not foreclose the lawyer from
acting in a normative capacity. One helpful way to portray this function is in
terms of Joseph Raz's concept of detached normative statements.5 7 Raz gives
the example of a Christian saying to his Orthodox Jewish friend who is about to
eat something like a pork-filled dumpling unwittingly, "You ought not to eat
that."58 Such a statement is fully normative, yet the Christian speaks from the
point of view of one who understands the Kosher laws without endorsing or
following them. Attorneys similarly may suggest to a client what her reasons for
action are in light of the client's goals without necessarily endorsing those
values.59
outcome of this weighing, remains the client's responsibility to take. Thus. Rule 1.2(a) provides that a "lawyer
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation" with some limitations. RULES. supra
note 32. Rule 1.2(a). No specific counterpart was provided for in the Code, see CODE, supra note 32, EC 7-7.
56. Wolfram has captured the qualities of being a practical counselor when he writes:
It is much more important for the lawyer to understand that legal issues come attached to autonomous
persons who typically have lived with their problems and will continue to live with their solutions or
failures to solve them. Client problems are not only-and perhaps not even primarily-legal. They must
be seen in all their dimensions, including moral, psychological, and economic dimensions beyond the
strictly legal. Also important is the lawyer's self-awareness-an understanding of the lawyer's own hu-
manity and its important involvement in every representation.
C. WOLFRAM MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 688 (1986) (emphasis added). "[Clonscience is offered, not asserted."
ShaTer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 231, 241 (1979).
57. PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 42, at 175-77.
58. Cited in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTIAM 154 (1982).
Ra7's distinction between committed and detached normative statements focuses attention on a little-
noticed but important feature of moral discourse. It is a feature of such discourse that normative state-
ments may be made both by those who themselves accept the relevant principles as guides to conduct and
standards of evaluation and those who do not so accept them. Statements made by the former are commit-
ted statements and are to be contrasted with statements made by those who speak from the point of view
of those who accept the principles and so speak as if they themselves accepted them though they do not in
fact do so. Such statements are detached .... Similar normative statements [referring to example in text]
of law (not merely statements about the law) may be made from the point of view of one who accepts the
laws of some system as guides to conduct, but though made from that point of view are in fact made by
one who may be an anarchist and so does not share it.
Id. at 154.
59. Role-differentiation critics. nonetheless, complain that "the moral detachment of the lawyer adversely
affects the quality of the lawyer-client relationship." Postema 1980. supra note 7, at 80. Postema makes the
further curious observation that the lawyer
views himself not as a moral actor but as a legal technician, In addition, he is barred from recognizing the
client's moral personality. The moral responsibilities of the client are simply of no interest to him. Thus.
paradoxically, the combination of partisanship and neutrality jeopardizes client autonomy and mutual
respect (two publicly stated objects of the standard conception), and yields instead a curious kind of
impersonal relationship.
Id.
Setting aside questions about the accuracy of this description, this claim that partisanship and neutrality
jeopardize client autonomy is contradicted by the Boundaries Principle. Such critics would abrogate respect for
the client and the lawyer's autonomy to further some 'higher goal,' such as "whether assisting the client would
further justice." Simon 1988. supra note II, at 1083.
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Reference to another professional field with a strong adherence to the cen-
trality of the professional-client relationship may illustrate why the Boundaries
Principle is necessary and how it contributes to the integrity of both lawyers
and clients. Suppose one is a therapist specializing in marriage counseling. A
woman comes for assistance in deciding on whether or not she should continue
in her marriage or should seek a divorce. In working with this woman, does the
counselor have a moral obligation to take responsibility for whether divorce is or
is not morally right? Suppose a man who is a homosexual seeks assistance from
a therapist. Does the therapist have a moral responsibility for guiding this man
toward heterosexuality or toward making peace with his sexual orientation de-
pending on whether or not the therapist considers homosexuality to be morally
right?
These examples should make it clear that choosing between the values of
commitment and marriage or independence and divorce is a moral decision for
the client but not for the marriage counselor. Choosing whether to live a life
consistent with one's sexual orientation despite societal opprobrium is a decision
for the client and not for the therapist to make. In fact, if the counselor or
therapist has strong feelings one way or the other about the morality of divorce
or of homosexuality, they shouldn't engage in marriage counseling or work with
homosexuals since such strongly held values are likely to lead them to intrude
on their clients' moral autonomy by breaching the proper boundary between
themselves and their clients as independent moral beings.60
60. Of course, there are limits for both therapists and lawyers in their non-judgmental approach to profes-
sional services. If a client comes to a therapist to discuss child abuse, in many jurisdictions the therapist is legally
responsible for reporting the client to legal authorities. Although lawyers have not yet been made mandatory
reporters of child abuse, they are clearly forbidden to counsel or assist a client to break the law. See, e.g., Model
Rule 1.2(d) and 3.3(a)(2). For an example of appropriate counseling see Marecek, Counseling Adolescents With
Problem Pregnancies. 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGY 89 (1987). Deciding on what client goals would further justice as
Professor Simon would have the lawyer do, Simon 1978. supra note II. is surely equally as intrusive and disre-
spectful as a therapist deciding to further marriage or heterosexuality. Role-differentiation critics might reject
analogies to psychotherapy on the grounds that legal professionals cannot be compared to other practitioners. For
example. William Simon argues:
The analogies to such roles as doctor and priest are fundamentally misleading. For unlike the relations
defined by these roles, the lawyer-client relation is fundamentally impersonal and other-regarding. . .. In
the case of doctors and priests, the principal impact of the professional's activity occurs within the profes-
sional relation in the form of the change which the patient or penitent undergoes. But in the case of
lawyers, the principal impact occurs outside the professional relation. The client benefits only to the extent
that outsiders are affected.
Simon. Honio Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism. 32 STAN. L. REv. 487. 501-02 (1980).
An example which illustrates how specious this argument is would be to consider the circumstance of a
surgeon operating to remove a bullet, exquisitely close to a vital artery, from a Mafia don. If the surgeon permits
herself a millimeter of error, she will lose her patient and save hundreds of persons from drug addiction, misery
and death. The impact of the doctor's remembering her Hippocratic oath is not so significant in terms of its
consequences for the don himself as it is in terms of its effect on outsiders. Simon's description of the lawyer-client
relationship is normatively impoverished. It underestimates the impact on clients of being assisted to think about
what they ought to do in a particular situation by examining the range of reasons for action and exploring the
consequences of their choices. This is a function encouraged by, for example, Rule 2.1 providing that when serving
as an advisor "a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation." RULES. supra note 32. The Comment to Rule 2.1
notes at [21:
Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical
considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. . . . Although a lawyer is not a
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Lawyers are fully accountable for their own acts-but not for their clients'
acts.61 Clients' goals are a part of the circumstances in which the lawyer acts
and can make a difference. The lawyer's evaluation of the morality of a client's
acts are certainly relevant to the decision whether to undertake a representation
as well as whether or not to terminate one already undertaken.6 2 Some lawyers
may well feel obligated to refrain from representing a cigarette manufacturer
because of their personal abhorrence of the product produced. Most lawyers
would feel obligated to withdraw from a representation were their client to at-
tempt to associate them in lying to a court.63 But these lawyers would be taking
moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may deci-
sively influence how the law will be applied.
RULES. supra note 32, Rule 2.1 comment. This richly normative perspective is totally overlooked by role-differen-
tiation critics like Luban, who in Appendix I of his book, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5. defends the basis
for his "standard conception" and never examines this aspect of the Rules. It also ignores the legal profession's
increasing attention to the centrality of the counseling function to the lawyer-client relationship. The Model Rules
illustrate this point by their attention to the lawyer as counselor in Rule 2.1. See the excellent discussion in
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 51, beginning at 497. See generally, R. BASTRESS & J. HARBAUGH. INTERVIEWING.
COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATING (1990); G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS (1978); D.
BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1977); D. BINDER. P. BERGMAN & S. PRICE.
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS (1990); L. BROWN & E. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS: MATERIALS ON A
NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS (1978); R. REDMOUNT & T. SHAFFER, LEGAL COUNSELING (1976); R.
RIEDMOUNT, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1980); M. SCHOENFIELD, INTERVIEWING AND COUNSEL-
ING (1981); T. SHAFFER. LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL (1987); A. WATSON. THE
LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING PROCESS (1976). See also counselor require-
ments beginning at Rule 2.1 SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 162 (West.
1989 ed.) [hereinafter SELECTED STATUTES].
61. Thus, EC 7-17 of the Code provides that the duty of loyalty to a client is a professional duty and "implies
no obligation to adopt a personal viewpoint favorable to the interests or desires of his client . .. [Hie may take
positions on public issues and espouse legal reforms he favors without regard to the individual view of any client."
CoDE. supra note 32, EC 7-17 (1980). Rule 1.2(b) provides that a "lawyer's representation of a client . . . does
not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities." RULES, supra
note 32, Rule 1.2(b).
62. DR 2-110 (Withdrawal from Employment) at (C) (Permissive Withdrawal) (1)(e) of the Code specifi-
cally contemplates such reasons for action by providing for permissive withdrawal of a lawyer from representing a
client who "insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to
the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules." CODE, supra note 32.
Rule 1.16(b)(3) also provides for permissive withdrawal when "a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the
lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent." RULES, supra note 32, Rule L.16(b)(3). The Rule is more far reaching
than DR 2-110 since it permits such withdrawal even when the case is before a tribunal so long as the tribunal
does not order the lawyer to continue representation. RULES, supra note 32, Rule 1.16(c).
63. Although the standards would appear to offer clear guidance on this issue, like all rules, they have engen-
dered a lively debate over interpretation. For example, the Code at DR 7-102 modifies the requirement of repre-
senting a client zealously by adding that such representation must be within the bounds of the law and at (A)(4)
requires that a "lawyer shall not ... [k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence." CODE. supra note 32.
DR 7-102. Professor Monroe Freedman created a firestorm over this issue by pointing out that "the conscientious
attorney is faced with what we may call a trilemma-that is, the lawyer is required to know everything, to keep it
in confidence, and to reveal it to the court." M FREEDMAN. LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 28
(1975). The Rules would appear to dispense with the problem in jurisdictions which have adopted them since,
Rule 3.3 (a)(4) requires that "A lawyer shall not knowingly . ., offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know or its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures," RULES. supra note 32, Rule 3.3(a)(4). Rule 3.3 (b) explicitly says that the requirement of
candor to the tribunal applies even if "compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
1.6 ...." which addresses the duty of confidentiality. RULES, supra note 32, Rule 3.3(b). But even a jurisdiction
which adopts the position contained in the Rules leaves attorneys still to solve additional issues such as how does
one "'know" one's client intends to commit perjury? Even assuming one does "know," what are the appropriate
remedial measures and will they successfully balance one's obligations to one's client, the tribunal and the system
of justice? Should one communicate this constraint on the obligation of confidentiality to the client, and, if so,
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responsibility for the morality of their own acts in these circumstances, not
those of their client.
Clients should not be accountable to their lawyers for the moral conse-
quences of their actions. If lawyers disagree with the personal and social values
promoted by a clients' goals, they need not represent the client. Lawyers have
an obligation both to themselves and to their potential clients to consider care-
fully whether a particular representation may be morally repugnant to them
before undertaking that representation. Often too little attention is given to this
issue before beginning a representation.64
If lawyers were to make themselves responsible for the moral consequences
to third parties and society in general of their clients' objectives, the proper
boundary between lawyer and client as independent moral beings would be
breached. The evils of paternalism 5 are as serious a danger to the lawyer-client
relationship66 as is the likelihood that lawyers would be unable to extricate
when? See also Nix v. Whiteside, 457 U.S. 157 (1986), Appel. Nix v. Whiteside: The Role of Apples. Oranges.
and the Great Houdini in Constitutional Adjudication, 23 CR51. L. BULL. 5 (1987), and LAWYERS AND JUSTICE.
supra note 5. at 199 n.44 for further complications.
64. Of course, as legal practice involves ever larger firms, a lawyer's ability to independently determine
whether or not he or she wishes to work for a particular client becomes more restricted. In 1984 a law firm of 85
attorneys would be considered one of the 250 largest firms in the country by 1989 the cutoff point grew to 125
lawyers. N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 18, 1989). "In the late 1950s only 38 law firms in the United States had more than fifty
lawyers . . .. [Bly 1985, over 500 had fifty-one or more lawyers .... ." Galanter & Palay. Why the Big Get
Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747. 749
(1990) (footnotes omitted). See generally Nelson, Ideology. Practice. and Professional Autonomy: Social Values
And Client Relationships In The Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985); Rosen, The Growth of Large
Law Firms and its Effect on the Legal Profession and Legal Education: The Inside Counsel Movement. Profes-
sional Judgment And Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479 (1989). There is no easy panacea for this
problem. Obviously, careful investigation of a firm and its values and procedures before associating with it be-
comes more crucial. However, I recognize that I am writing from the relative security of academia and that much
of what I say may at best be aspirational in a real world hedged in by bigger firms, fewer jobs and less access to
partnership.
65.
[C]lients go to professionals for their superior knowledge and skills; such knowledge and skill is a defining
feature of a profession. However, many decisions require balancing legal or health concerns against other
client interests. As many authors have noted, crucial professional decisions involve value choices. They are
not simple choices of technical means to ends, and even choices of means have a value component. Profes-
sionals have not had training in value choices. Even if they had, they might not know a client's value
scheme sufficiently to determine what is best for him when everything is considered. . . . To deny clients
authority and responsibility by adopting the paternalistic model is to deny them the freedom to direct
their own lives. Clients are not capable of determining the precise nature of their problems, or of knowing
the alternative courses of action and predicting their consequences or carrying them out on their own.
They need and want the technical expertise of a professional to do so. However, they are capable of
making reasonable choices among options on the basis of their total values. They need professionals' infor-
mation in order to make wise choices to accomplish their purposes.
Bayles. The Professional-Client Relationship, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROFESSIONAL LIFE. 113. 117-18 (Callahan
ed. 1988).
66. Critics of role-differentiation would not favor paternalistic behavior in situations involving vulnerable
individuals who lack material power. The paradigmatic case envisioned by the critics who press for moral account-
ability is that of the large, powerful corporation whose driving motivation of achieving material gain regardless of
the costs to individuals, society or the environment needs to be constrained. Granted such irresponsible and rapa-
cious clients surely exist, to make lawyers responsible for directing their energies in more benign directions is
simply futile. However, there is a vast middle ground of clients between the all vulnerable and the all pockerful.
For these clients the role-differentiation reading of the professional standards ignores opportunities for their law-
yers to encourage them to take actions mutually beneficial to themselves, their associates and their society without
usurping their ultimate capacity and right to make such important value decisions for themselves. Role-differenti-
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themselves from morally repugnant representations.6 7 It is essential, therefore,
for lawyers to respect the proper boundary between themselves and their clients
to avoid intruding on their clients' moral autonomy and to protect their own.
In their treatment of role theory, role-differentiation critics have converted
an abstract concept, role, into a thing which not only exists but can engage in
practical acts. They have transformed a conceptual, abstract fiction-role-into
something real, particularized, and capable of practical action.68 However,
moral actions depend on the activities of persons, who make choices about what
they ought to do in particular circumstances. A person's conception of his or her
role will influence these choices, but it is the person, not the role, who makes the
choices.
Once the ethical framework of analysis is clarified and it is understood that
the role-differentiation thesis mistakenly focuses on persons rather than circum-
ation critics portray a bleak picture of a win-lose situation in which advocacy for clients necessarily is at the
expense of innocent and vulnerable third parties as well as society in general. Increasingly, however, thoughtful
lawyers are recognizing that it is often possible to achieve better results for clients while, at the same time,
generating benefits for other parties to a dispute as well as third parties. This approach is characterized as one
which focuses on the interests that underlay positions, separates the people from the issues, and looks for options
for mutual gain on the basis of principled resolutions. See, e.g., R. FISHER & W. URY. GETTING TO YES (1981);
D. LAX & J. SEBENIUS, TIlE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR (1986).
67. Luban rather cavalierly dismisses concerns about paternalism. He complains that one of the major errors
of the "standard conception" in general and moral nonaccountability in particular is to worry
that if the lawyer does not adopt the client's ends, more or less as the client herself initially conceives of
them. she is being an elitist, a paternalist, or a moral bully. An attempt actively to engage the client in
moral dialogue, a transformation of her ends to something the lawyer finds more morally acceptable and
vice-versa is viewed as an infringement on the client's autonomy, which the lawyer is supposed to be
enhancing.
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 167. Thomas Nagel provides a particularly helpful discussion of balanc-
ing considerations of autonomy and paternalism:
There are two other types of coercion whose justification seems clear: prevention of harm to others and
certain very basic forms of paternalism. In both these types of case, we can make an impersonal appeal to
values that are generally shared: people don't want to be injured, robbed, or killed, and they don't want to
get sick.
The problematic cases are those in which either the impersonal value to which I appeal to justify
coercion would not be acknowledged by the one coerced, or else it conflicts with another impersonal value
to which he subscribes but which I do not acknowledge, though I would if I were he.
• . T]hc liberal position avoids two contrary errors. To accept as an authoritative impersonal value
everyone's interest in doing what he wants to do, for whatever reason .. .is to give too much authority to
other people's preferences in determining their claims on us. To accord impersonal weight to our own
values, whatever they are . .. is on the other hand not to give others enough authority over what we may
require of them.
Nagel. Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy. 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 224-26 (1987). As the nature of law
practice continues to change so that attorneys are increasingly caught up in large, impersonal bureaucracies, there
is increasing concern with maintaining integrity in lawyering. But this is not a matter that calls for so radical a
move as professional adoption of the need for moral accountability for clients' goals. Rather the issue is keeping
the management of the large firm focused on its responsibilities as professionals guided by principles outside the
market.
68. This transformation of a concept into something real is called reification. Its hypothesized importance to
law has been most thoroughly examined by writers generally associated with the critical legal studies movement.
See. e.g.. Davis. Critical Jurisprudence: An Essay on the Legal Theory of Robert Burt's Taking Care of Stran-
gers. 1981 WIs. L. REv. 419, 420-21 n.4, 427-29; Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning. 3 RES. L. & Sot. 25
(1980). Ironically. William Simon, as well as other role-differentiation critics, are associated with this movement.
which has made a fetish of denouncing the rule of law as at best illusory and most likely a deliberately misleading
fabrication of those who rule by examining the process of reification in the law.
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stances, the foundation for the argument for moral nonaccountability is de-
stroyed. In addition, the Boundaries Principle demonstrates that holding law-
yers accountable for the moral consequences of their clients' acts is, in fact,
wrong. 9
B. Partisanship in Lawyering
A critical problem for lawyering as a profession is determining just how far
loyalty to a client should be carried. As Professor Schwartz puts it: "When
acting as an advocate, a lawyer must, within the established constraints upon
professional behavior, maximize the likelihood that the client will prevail.17 0
Role-differentiation critics maintain that, according to the "standard conception
of lawyering," zealousness is bounded only by the limitations of what is lawful.
Moreover, lawfulness is very narrowly defined by these critics. Their arguments
for this view are presented first. The following section demonstrates that the
established constraints on lawyer zeal have a much broader reach than the crit-
ics acknowledge.
1. The Argument from Partisanship
As indicated above, role-differentiation critics portray lawyers as legal
technicians, unaccountable for the morality of a clients' ends. In addition, they
claim that lawyers decide what means to use to achieve their clients' purposes
constrained only by evaluations of effectiveness and professional regulations,
which are inadequate. 71 Thus, morality as to means is replaced by partisanship.
Moreover, role morality is used to justify hyperzealous legal tactics 72 that may
otherwise be immoral. Partisanship is supposed to be a role obligation of lawy-
ering that, according to Luban, "identifies professionalism with extreme parti-
san zeal on behalf of the client." ' As a consequence, a lawyer's sole obligation
in deciding on what tactics to use to further her clients' goals is based only on
69. It should be emphasized, however, that lawyers do have access to a powerful tool in their ability to make
use of the law and an accompanying moral obligation to make wise and responsible choices as to whom and what
to represent.
70. See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 673. Schwartz calls this the "principle of professionalism." which Luban
subsumes under Simon's rubric of partisanship. LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5. at 7 n.6.
71.
This principle [of partisanship] prescribes that the lawyer work aggressively to advance his client's ends.
The lawyer will employ means on behalf of his client which he would not consider proper in a non-
professional context even to advance his own ends. These means may involve deception, obfuscation, or
delay. Unlike the principle of neutrality, the principle of partisanship is qualified. A line separates the
methods which a lawyer should be willing to use on behalf of a client from those he should not use. Before
the lawyer crosses the line, he calls himself a representative- after he crosses it, he calls himself an officer
of the court.
Simon 1978. supra note 1I, at 36-37.
72. Examples of such hyperzeal include making "truthful opposing witnesses look like liars or fools.
fighting "for their client's 'right' to oppress and exploit, if the client wishes it;" defeating "just claims on techni-
calities if it can be done;" and keeping "'information confidential though it means ruination for a hapless third
party.- Luban. Introduction, in THE GOOD LAWYER 1-2 (D. Luban ed. 1983).
73. LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5, at xx.
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what is most likely to succeed.7 4 Lawyering thus becomes more like a sport than
a profession.7 5 All that counts is who wins so long as no rules of the game are
broken.76 Even on questions of legal strategy, lawyers retain no independent
evaluative moral function.
Critics of role-differentiation claim the "standard conception of lawyering"
encourages lawyers to use every possible technique at their command so long as
it is within the bounds of the law. They believe the profession's ethical stan-
dards embolden lawyers to interpret constraints on partisanship as minimal. For
instance, Luban dismisses attempts to constrain the excesses of partisanship
with notions like good faith. The Code provides: "In his representation of a
client, a lawyer shall not knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwar-
ranted under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if
it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law."' 7 Luban contends that some lawyers will simply ra-
tionalize their behavior by translating good faith into a mere belief "that the
argument or contention is up to professional standards of what may acceptably
be offered." Others, whom he characterizes as instrumentalist lawyers, will
treat good faith "as a manipulable legal term rather than as a moral limit." 78
74. Postema claims "the principle of partisanship requires the lawyer zealously and with exclusive loyalty to
pursue the client's objectives ...." Postema 1983, supra note 17. at 311 n.9.
75. The label "profession" is not used here in the pejorative way it is applied by Simon in his 1978 article.
Simon 1978. supra note II. See also positive approaches to law as a profession by Justice O'Connor and Professor
Kronman, supra note 31.
76. For a text that promotes such a vision of partisanship, see D. NISSMAN & E. HAGEN. THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION (1982); for a criticism of such a narrow view of the obligations of lawyering, see the review essay by
Belsky. On Becoming and Being a Prosecutor. 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1485 (1984). See generally R. GRUTSIAN.
LAWYERS AND THIEVES (1990); Underwood. Adversary Ethics: More Dirty Tricks, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY
265 (1982).
77. CODE. supra note 32. DR 7-102(A)(2) (emphasis added). The Rules provide similarly that "A lawyer
shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so
that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law." RULES. supra note 32, Rule 3.1 (emphasis added). Rule I I of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also
provides, in part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law ....
FED. R. CIV. P. I I (emphasis added).
78. LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5. at 17. This may be a correct characterization of the "instrumental
lawyer.'* The problem is that Luban treats such readers of the professional standards as typical and the paradig-
matic example of the kind or attorney to whom the law of lawyering is addressed. Compare the discussion by the
major commentators in HAZARD & HODES. supra note 51, on Rule 3.1. and its federal judicial counterpart, Rule
II. where the meaning of good faith as a limit on advocacy has been litigated. Hazard and Hodes note the
increasing tendency of courts to require lawyers to meet an objective rather than a subjective standard to avoid
being sanctioned for frivolousness. A richer understanding of good faith would portray lawyers as recognizing the
tremendous responsibility they carry when they are given such wide discretion to decide on their own behavior. By
becoming lawyers they understand they have forgone various opportunities to take actions that might well be
permitted were law not a profession (as well as a business) and if they did not have duties to the legal system and
the general society in addition to their clients. Cf. S. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH (forthcoming); Burton,
"Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith." 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980).
Although in the last decade and a half the legal profession has become increasingly responsive to the market, one
of the primary forces responsible for these developments, the Supreme Court, has repeatedly affirmed the special
obligations attendant on law as a profession. For example, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447
(1978), the Court upheld the discipline ofa lawyer for soliciting clients in person for pecuniary gain. On the same
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The argument from partisanship does not recognize that curbs on zealous-
ness may depend on the setting in which lawyering may occur. Hyperzeal is the
postulated requirement regardless of whether lawyers are advocating for a client
in a courtroom, negotiating with another lawyer, or counseling clients in their
private offices. Their representation in any of these settings, according to "the
standard conception," is bridled only by strategic considerations and not by con-
cern for personal or social norms of behavior or by obligations to the legal sys-
tem itself.79
Moreover, according to the "ideology of advocacy," lawyers have no re-
sponsibility to refrain from undermining the moral authority of law by avoiding
the use of tactics that may be detrimental to this authority. 0 Thus, they should
use whatever loopholes they can find in the law to promote their clients' ends
regardless of the consequences to respect for the law's authority. The principle
of partisanship turns the "lawyer into a mere instrument of the client's inter-
ests." 8' To treat "law and legal arguments as mere instruments ... undermines
the authority of the law."8 Instrumentalist lawyers are said to display contempt
for the law. 83 For Luban, this is the most significant cost of partisanship since
the authority of law depends on its generalizability. Those who act as partisans
and seek to take advantage of every legal loophole that might conceivably be
available to a client undermine the credibility of the law itself as seeking to be
both just and fair and hence demean the moral authority of the law.
Although parasitic on the principle of moral nonaccountability, the princi-
ple of partisanship, interpreted by role-differentiation critics as requiring
hyperzeal in selecting the means used to achieve the goals of a legal representa-
tion, contributes its own set of ills to lawyering. Because partisan advocacy is
unconstrained by moral considerations, it results in adversarial excesses that
themselves serve to undermine the legitimacy of the law. A possible metaphor
for understanding the costs of hyperzeal to the respectability of law would be to
day as the Ohralik decision, however, the Court rejected the state's punishment of a lawyer who sought to further
political and ideological goals through solicitation by mail. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
79. Role-diffcrentiation critics simply ignore provisions in the standards requiring lawyers to preserve the
integrity of the legal system itself and their obligations to serve as officers of the court. See, e.g.. rules like Rule
3.3 on Candor Toward the Tribunal and Rule 3.4 on Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel. EC 9-6 of the Code
proclaims: "Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his profession: to encourage
respect for the law and for the courts ....'"
80. Luban argues for justifying an obligation to obey the law, i.e., the moral authority of law, on the basis of
the "generality requirement."
To use a law for its loophole value is to treat it as though the loophole is its central case and reflects the
law's real purpose. And if that is the dominant way the law is used, its legitimate purpose becomes irrele-
vant. practically speaking. Functionally, the law serves to favor special interests, and therefore it fails the
generality requirement. Abusive tax shelters are a paradigmatic illustration. . . . [T]he instrumentalist
lawyer seems indifferent to the distinctive feature that alone makes a law more than coercion: its general-
ity, the fact that it implicates all in the community and shapes their condition.
LAWYERS AND JUSICE, supra note 5, at 48-49. For some examples of lawyers acting just as role-dif'erentiation
critics claim, see the description of the merger and acquisition specialist, Joseph Flom. and his associates during
the Conoco takeover in P. HEYMANN & L. LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES
106 (1988).
81. LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5. at 13.
82. Id. at 16.
83. Id. at 17.
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compare the sports of tennis and ice hockey. Recall that when John McEnroe
had temper tantrums on the tennis court and threw his racket at the referee for
making calls against him, the crowd booed and commentators considered him a
spoiled brat who was detracting from the high standards of sportsmanship re-
quired in tennis. However, ice hockey players are expected to engage in
whatever brutality they can get away with on the ice, and the game is consid-
ered a rough sport where sportsmanship bows to winning at all costs. The kind
of partisanship envisioned as central to lawyering turns law into ice hockey.
2. Critique of the Argument from Partisanship
The role-differentiation thesis claims that lawyers determine the means to
pursue their clients' goals constrained only by concern for effectiveness. They
serve as amoral or even immoral legal technicians and often engage in
hyperzeal since winning is their sole concern. Role-differentiation critics, how-
ever, mischaracterize the reach of zealousness in partisanship by treating
hyperzeal as paradigmatic of what constitutes good lawyering in their "standard
conception." Thus, they fail to read the Code requirement that lawyers shall
represent clients zealously8" either in its entirety or in conjunction with its mate,
which requires lawyers to represent a client within the bounds of the law.85
Thus, they simply ignore the fact that the Code, for instance, specifically recog-
nizes that zealousness permits lawyers to avoid offensive tactics,88 to exercise
their professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of their
client,87 and to refuse to aid or participate in conduct that the lawyer believes to
be unlawful, even though there is some support for an argument that the con-
duct is legal.88
In fact, the professional standards propose bounded zeal rather than
hyperzeal as paradigmatic of good lawyering. An attorney's zeal in client repre-
sentation is bounded in three ways. It is explicitly constrained by professional
ethical standards and local, state and federal rules that regulate lawyering di-
rectly. Less directly, it is limited by substantive law such as the law of torts that
determines what constitutes defamation or intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Most significantly, zeal is bounded by the fact that its justification,
client loyalty, is not unlimited. Although loyalty is a central value of lawyering,
it is not preemptive of all other values. For example, attorneys must be equally
protective of the integrity of the legal system itself by fulfilling obligations as
84. CODE. supra note 32. DR 7-101.
85. CODE. supra note 32. DR 7-102. DR 7-101 describes the standard for representing a client as requiring
7calou.ness. and (A)(I) provides initially that "[a] lawyer shall not intentionally: fail to seek the lawful objectives
of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules." The "ideology of
advocacy" supposedly sets no constraints on a lawyer's choice of means to implement zealous advocacy at this
point. However. DR 7-101 (A)(1) concludes with the phrase "except as provided by DR 7-102(B)."
86. Corm. supra note 32, DR 7-101(A)(I).
87. Conh. supra note 32. DR 7-101(B)(I).
88. CoDv. supra note 32, DR 7-101(B)(2).
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officers of the court which may directly compromise client interests.", Role-dif-
ferentiation critics mischaracterize client loyalty as subservience to the client's
will.9o However, loyalty is "faithful adherence to one's promise."9' It is the con-
tent of the promise of representation, therefore, that determines the reach of
client loyalty.
The promise requires exclusivity of representation, devotion and compe-
tence, and a commitment to confidentiality. 92 The pledge of exclusivity entails
the core commitment to avoid conflicts of interest in that representation. Law-
yers avoid such conflicts of interest by excluding as reasons for action considera-
tion of their own interests or the interests of third parties in determining what
course of action to take on behalf of a client. Loyalty to clients is a value em-
bedded in a larger context. It does not preclude lawyers from considering and
discussing with clients their obligations to justice and to the legal system.93
Moreover, the ethical standards of the profession are quite clear that lawyers
not only must be loyal to their clients, but they must also protect the integrity
of the legal system itself.94
89. Thus, Rule 3.1 requires lawyers to bring only nonfrivolous claims. Rule 3.3 requires attorneys to be
candid in their dealings with a tribunal while Rule 3.4 calls for fairness towards an opposing party and counsel.
See RULES. supra note 32, Rules 3.1-.4.
90. The principle of partisanship turns the "lawyer into a mere instrument of the client's interests." LAW-
YERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 13.
91. I THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 480 (1981).
92. RULES, supra note 32, Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.6, 1.7, and CODE, supra note 32, DR 6-101(A)(1), DR 5-101(A).
DR 5-105(A). As the Boundaries Principle holds, the promise of loyalty as expressed through maintaining confi-
dences does not obliterate the lawyers' moral independence and condone lying. See S. BOK, LYING 154-73 (1979).
93. Particularly when lawyers act as advisers about future actions rather than as advocates in litigation about
past activities, the standards emphasize the need for a more balanced partisanship. See, e.g., CODE, supra note 32.
EC 7-3 comment at n.9.
Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer may depend on whether he is serving as
advocate or adviser. . . The reasons that justify and even require partisan advocacy in the trial of a cause
do not grant any license to the lawyer to participate as legal advisor in a line of conduct that is immoral,
unfair, or of doubtful legality. In saving himself from this unworthy involvement, the lawyer. . . must be
at pains to preserve a sufficient detachment from his client's interests so that he remains capable of a
sound and objective appraisal of the propriety of what his client proposes to do.
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1161 (1958). The more recently
adopted and now dominant Rules divide the professional obligations of the lawyer as counselor from that of the
lawyer as advocate. Rule 2.1, Advisor, provides that "[in rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law
but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation." RULES, supra note 32, Rule 2.1. Role-differentiation critics are not content to merely weaken
the loyalty to client obligation when they insist on moral accountability which requires being responsible to third
parties and society as a primary obligation of lawyering. In so doing, they reorder priorities central to any essen-
tially dyadic relationship. It is the kind of reordering we criticize in those who decide to become parents and then
place their children's interests after concern for their work. It is entirely appropriate for the lawyer to share his or
her concerns with the client but it would be presumptuous and intrusive for the lawyer to assume that once the
client has had the opportunity to share the lawyer's reflections that the client should not be free to decide to
balance reasons differently and determine on a course of action which might not be the lawyer's most valued
option. If the lawyer feels strongly enough, withdrawal from representation is usually an option in civil cases.
94. Rule 3.3, for example, requires candor toward the tribunal. Conditions are now set for the classic con-
frontation between competing loyalties-loyalty to clients by not revealing their confidences (Rule 1,6) including
their intention to lie to a tribunal and loyalty to the profession and the legal system by protecting the tribunal
from lies in order to maintain its integrity. The Code and Rules resolve the confrontation differently. The Rules.
which control professional practice in the majority of the states, give precedence to the duty of candor and thus
loyalty to the tribunal trumps the value of client loyalty so long as revelation of a client confidence will keep the
"proceedings ... as free of fraud as the lawyer can reasonably make them . . ." HAZARD & HODES, supra note
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Loyalty also involves a pledge by lawyers to devote their "intellectual, emo-
tional, and professional resources in order to further the client's interests." 95
This aspect of loyalty is captured by the requirements of competence and confi-
dentiality in a legal representation. Making a promise to another person gives
extra weight to considering client interests in deciding what to do, but it does
not exclude all other reasons for action. The promise of competent and confiden-
tial representation does not foreclose a lawyer from considering and acting on
reasons that may outweigh the obligation of loyalty. On the one hand, attorneys
cannot properly decide to violate their promise of competence because they can
make a lot of money by representing a client in an area of law about which they
are totally ignorant."' On the other hand, they should not and need not adhere
to their promise of confidentiality when their client seeks to make them an ac-
complice to perjury or to the death of an innocent person. 7 One can debate the
scope of overriding considerations, but the Code and Rules clearly qualify the
duty of loyalty to recognize requirements of social responsibility.
Lawyering does not require the kind of hyperzeal that characterizes the
principle of partisanship. The role-differentiation thesis treats examples of
hyperzeal by lawyers in practice as constitutive of the professional ethic.9 They
proffer extreme examples of partisanship and amorality as paradigmatic of the
profession's preferred practices.99 Such examples can be found and so do have
some descriptive accuracy.100 But the ethic of the profession is not coincident
51. at 355. The lawyer's obligation is to protect the integrity of the process, but the "advocate is not transformed
into a policeman enforcing truthfulness in litigation." Id. at 355.
95. C. WOLFRAM. MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 56, at 146.
96. In fact, Schneyer has argued persuasively that the client-regarding behavior labeled partisanship by the
role-differentiation critics rather than being a manifestation of the zealousness required by the "standard concep-
tion" is more readily understood as a result of "the common financial, psychological and organizational pressues of
law practice." Schneyer, supra note 9. at 1543.
97. See generally infra text accompanying notes 210-19.
98. Schneyer's review of the empirical evidence, spotty as it may be, demonstrates that the critics haven't
painted a fair picture of attorneys. He concludes: "[T]hese empirical studies show that lawyers in their various
roles do not as a matter of course do things for clients that are contrary to the lawyers' personal values or harmful
to the legitimate interests of third parties." Schneyer, supra note 9. at 1550.
99. In fact, of course, hyperzeal is not paradigmatic of practice at all. Very little research has been done in
this area. but what little has been reported suggests a far more complicated picture of lawyer practices than the
role-differentiation critics claim. For instance, Schneyer reported on an unpublished study by sociologist Donald
Landon of 200 trial lawyers who practice in small communities. Rather than finding evidence of hyperzeal. the
study found the lawyers were "reluctant to pursue their clients' initial aims without considering the appropriate-
ness of these aims. Indeed, they often approached their cases as mediators.. . . Landon's advocates were unwill-
ing to use sharp tactics to gain an advantage over a lawyer they knew and regularly dealt with." Schneyer, supra
note 9, at 1546-47.
100. Luban. e.g., quotes Judge Miles Lord's remarks to the officers (and presumably their lawyers as well) in
the Dalkon Shield products liability case:
[W~hen the time came for these women to make their claims against your company, you attacked their
characters, you inquired into their sexual practices and into the identity of their sex partners. You exposed
these women and ruined families and reputations and careers in order to intimidate those who would raise
their voices against you. You introduced issues that had no relationship whatsoever to the fact that you
planted in the bodies of these women instruments of death. of mutilations, of disease.
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE. supra note 5. at 152. Luban cites a well known casebook in professional responsibility for
this quotation. S. GILLERS & N. DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 609 (1985). In their second edition. Gillers
and Dorsen include an excerpt from a book by Morton Mintz on the Dalkon Shield case in a section on Ethics in
Advocat' and Hardball. They conclude the section by asking: "Does a client have a right to have his or her
counsel engage in such tactics? Short of creating new sanctions for this new kind of conduct, can the bar realisti-
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with the practice of its least honorable members. The prevailing ethic depends
on what conduct is criticized. 01 It is a mistake to treat what some lawyers may
generally do as characteristic of the accepted legal ethic. It would be like taking
the empirical fact of an increase in medical malpractice lawsuits as evidence for
a new normative principle that the medical profession no longer believed that
doctors should take due care in the treatment of their patients.' 0 ' Hyperzeal is
cally expect to reverse the 'race to the cellar'?" S. GILLERS & N. DORSEN. REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS
OF LAW AND ETHICS 529 (1989) [hereinafter GILLERS & DORSEN]. Query whether such a formulation of the issue
does not contribute to fostering hyperzeal? For empirical support for the proposition that the client-above-all
perspective shapes the way lawyers resolve ethical issues, see K. MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A
PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985). But see Schneyer, Getting Front (Is) to (Ought) in Legal Ethics:
Mann's Defending White Collar Crime," 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 903. See also sociologist Douglas Rosen-
thal's study of personal injury lawyers for evidence of the use of hyperzeal in encouraging clients to lie about the
extent of their injuries, D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 45 (1974). the report of
former litigator Wayne Brazil on failures to report adverse legal authority to the court, Brazil. The Attorney as
Victim: Toward More Candor about the Psychological Price Tag of Litigation Practice, 3 J. LEGAL PROF. 107.
111 (1978). A. Goldman, who is also a role-differentiation critic, suggests in his book on professional ethics, which
includes a chapter on legal ethics, the example of the relentless cross-examination of a rape victim about her prior
sexual conduct in order to degrade and demoralize her, A. GOLDMAN THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS 102-03 (1980).
101. CONCEPT, supra note 42, 52-56. For criticism of teaching an unbridled advocacy model, see Hegland,
Moral Dilemmas in Teaching Trial Advocacy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 69 (1982).
102. Of course there are some lawyers who engage in tactics that display hyperzeal who would claim that
such behavior is required by their professional obligations. "Not only do most criminal defense lawyers view their
role as requiring unwavering loyalty to their clients, but this client-above-all perspective shapes their resolution of
hard ethical issues." Uphoff. The Role Of The Criminal Defense Lawyer In Representing The Mentally Impaired
Defendant: Zealous Advocate Or Officer Of The Court?, 1988 Wts. L. REV. 65. 66. Nonetheless, the leadership of
the American Bar Association sees lawyers as having a much more complex set of ethical obligations than simple
client partisanship. For example, in reflecting on the meaning of professionalism, L. Stanley Chauvin. Jr., Presi-
dent of the ABA for 1989-1990, recently wrote:
The idea of professionalism embraces a higher standard of conduct than the minimums set forth in the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and in the ethics codes of the various states. Professionalism
means we accept and abide by lifelong obligations that come with the practice of law--obligations to
clients, to the courts, to our brothers and sisters at the bar, to public and private employers, to opposing
counsel and parties, and to the public in general. But if we're going to retain the right to call ourselves
professionals, we have to go beyond what the code requires. We have to emphasize the spirit of the law
and aspire to a higher standard. There is a great tradition in this profession that needs to be preserved.
We will preserve that tradition and emphasize our roles as problem solvers to the same degree that we
maintain our love for truth and justice.
Meaning of Professionalism, I PROF. LAW. 16 (Summer 1989) (interview with L. Stanley Chavin, Jr.). Moreover,
even the basic controls on zealousness required by the Model Rules, for example, are far more constraining than
popular presentations of "lawyers in action" like a television program such as "L.A. Law" might portray. The
premier authorities on interpreting the Rules. Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes. write:
Part 3 of the Model Rules sets forth an important list of special rules for advocates. Significantly. almost
all of them are limitations upon an advocate's conduct. Part 3 draws heavily upon Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, copying verbatim many of its specific limitations, but also capturing its essen-
tial teaching that lawyers must represent clients "zealously," but "within the bounds of the law." The
emphasis on limitations is not hard to explain. In the ethos of partisan representation, American lawyers
don't need any special exhortations to be zealous when acting as advocates. To use one of many sports
images that may be applied to courtroom lawyers, they are like fighters answering the bell. In light of this
predisposition, the drafters of both codes realized that lawyers need to be reminded of the other half of
their duties as advocates-their duty to the court, the public, and even their adversaries. It is not true that
anything goes.' [sic] even hardball is played according to rules. Or as Robert Kutak once wrote, "it may
be a dog-eat-dog world. but one dog may eat another only according to the rules .. " The justification
for imposing additional limitations on advocacy-which concededly can work to the disadvantage even of
clients who have engaged in no wrongdoing is twofold. First, society at large has an interest in maintain-
ing the efficiency of its tribunals. Second, society has an interest in assuring that its most coercive
processes are, and are perceived to be, fair. The idea that lawyers have an enforceable duty to be 'fair' to
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regularly criticized by leading members of the legal profession and punished by
the judiciary.10 3 Sharp practices are neither condoned nor encouraged by the
standards of the profession. 104
The role-differentiation thesis is also self-contradictory. It characterizes
lawyers as amoral practitioners of hyperzeal who place client loyalty above all
other values. However, the capacity to assume the duty of loyalty to another
person such as a client requires the agent to have the capacity for moral action.
Persons who can neither perceive what they ought to do nor commit themselves
to that required action, lack the capacity to create a professional relationship of
attorney to client. Yet, the thesis argues that as a consequence of the principle
of partisanship, lawyers are deprived of their moral personhood and serve solely
as legal technicians. Treating lawyers as mere instruments of a client's will viti-
ates the essential quality that founds the capacity for loyalty at all. Instruments
of another's will cannot even engage in making the promise of loyalty. The in-
strumental characterization denies lawyers the very moral autonomy constitu-
tive of personhood that is the predicate for being able to promise to be loyal as a
legal representative.1 0 5 It is not possible to serve merely as the instrument of
nonclients contradicts the simplistic conception of the lawyer as hired gladiator, but it has always been a
fundamental theme of the law of lawycring, as opposed to professional mythology.
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 51, at 328-328.1 (1988 Supp.) (emphasis in original).
103. Thus, at an annual retreat to examine selected issues in criminal justice organized by the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, Professor Richard Uviller of Columbia Law School and a former prosecutor
criticized the defense bar and urged his listeners "not to allow mistaken or exaggerated notions of the role require-
ments imposed upon us by the adversary model to deprive us of the central feature of our professional identity: the
capacity for and the sound exercise of judgment." GILLERS & DORSEN, supra note 100, at 539 (1989). At the
same meeting. Professor Anthony Amsterdam of New York University Law School, who has served as both a
prosecutor and a defense lawyer, detailed the aspects or prosecutorial behavior he found "inappropriate or ques-
tionable." Id. These included the tendency to see the prosecutorial role "as nothing but that of the legal technician
or the power-broker waging adversarial combat." Id. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York
took the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell to task in a series of blistering opinions for its hyperzeal in knowingly
misusing the state's discovery rules to obtain the opposing party's confidential information in a surrogate's court
case and disqualified the firm from continuing its representation. In re Beiny, 129 A.D. 2d 126. 517 N.Y.S.2d 474
(Ist Dept. 1987); In re Beiny. 132 A.D. 2d 190, 522 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1st Dept. 1987); appeal dismissed 71 N.Y.2d
994. 524 N.E. 2d 879, 529 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1988). See also Campbell Indus v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.
1980) (affirmed decision of trial court to disqualify plaintiffs experts from testifying for defense because ex parte
discussions violated discovery rules); Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 39 F.R.D. 592 (N.D. III. 1986). ad,
404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1988) (intentional cross-examination to mislead jury to believe testimony would be im-
peached, when in fact no impeachment followed justified new trial and assessment of costs and attorney fees
against abusing defendant and defense counsel.
104. See Schneycr, supra note 9, at 1551-57.
105. For example, Postema claims that:
.. .the standard conception [of lawyering] calls for a sharp separation of private and professional moral-
ity . . . . The conception requires a public endorsement, as well as private adoption, of the extreme strat-
egy of detachment . . . .The good lawyer leaves behind his own family, religious, political, and moral
concerns, and devotes himself entirely to the client. But since professional integrity is often taken to be the
most important mark of personal integrity, a very likely result is often that a successful lawyer is one who
can strictly identify with this professional strategy of detachment . . . . The maximal strategy [or identifi-
cation with the professional role) yields a severe impoverishment of moral experience. The lawyer's moral
experience is sharply constrained by the boundaries of the moral universe of the role. But the minimal
strategy [of distancing oneself from one's professional activities] involves perhaps even higher personal
costs. Since the characteristic activities of the lawyer require a large investment of his moral faculties, the
lawyer must reconcile himself to a kind of moral prostitution . ..he is alienated from his own moral
reelings and attitudes and indeed from his moral personality as a whole . . . . [lit ... involves a substan-
tial element of self-deception . . .. [T~he lawyer who must detach professional judgment from his own
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another's will and still retain a moral personality capable of entering into a
relationship of loyalty to another. To institute and to maintain a lawyer-client
relationship depends on lawyers' moral capacity to assume the responsibilities
entailed by the promise of representation.
II. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FRAMEWORK
The prior sections of this Article have demonstrated that the role-differen-
tiation critics have seriously misconceived the standard conception of lawyering
articulated in the ethical standards of the profession. This next part will demon-
strate that one of the basic reasons for this error lies in their mistaken concep-
tion of the jurisprudence of legal positivism, 106 which they correctly see as the
dominant legal philosophy of American law. Their conception of legal positiv-
ism will be presented first followed by a critique of their argument from legal
positivism.
A. The Argument from Legal Positivism
William Simon, a leading role-differentiation critic, best explains the basic
jurisprudential framework adopted by the role-differentiation critics. He con-
tends that the dominant view of lawyering in American society was provided by
legal positivism. Simon introduces his interpretation of positivism and then at-
tacks this conception. 07 Simon's understanding of "positivist legal theory" has
three main features: (1) it "emphasizes the separation of law from personal and
social norms"; 08 (2) it connects law "with the authoritative application of
force";109 and (3) it posits "the systematic, objective character of law."' 10 For
our purposes, the most important point is that legal positivism is supposed to
separate law and morals and to privilege law.'' Law is understood as a descrip-
tive set of statements about what the law is, not a prescriptive set of statements
about what the law ought to be. The separation of law and morals is seen as
complete, leaving law as a discourse devoid of normativity 5 2 That is, law is
moral judgment is deprived of the resources from which arguments regarding his client's legal rights and
duties can be fashioned.
Postema 1980. supra note 7, at 78-79. But see Kronman's view of detachment. supra note 31, at 853.
106. Professor Postema should be excepted from this claim. See Postema, Coordination and Convention at
the Foundations of Law, II J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1982).
107. Simon 1978, supra note 1I. The paper is both lengthy and complicated. I do not attempt to evaluate the
article in its entirety here. For its impact on other role-differentiation theorists, see LAWYIERS AND JLSTI'E. supra
note 5. at 173 n.34, 329 n.21. For its continuing relevance in characterizing positivism, note its inclusion in the
very recent casebook by HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note 10, at 27.
108. Id. at 39.
109. Id.
I10. Id.
I11. Id. Simon acknowledges that his conception of legal positivism is a pastiche and simplification that
lumps together such diverse philosophers of law as Austin, Hart. Holmes and Kelsen. Id. at 39 n.24.
112. Distinguishing between assertions that are normative and those that are descriptive or empirical is cen-
tral to law but rarely addressed. But see Stier, Privileging Empiricism in Legal Dialogue: Death and Dangerous-
ness, 21 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 271 (1988). Herewith, an illustration-when the Supreme Court holds that after
viability, a state may intervene to foreclose a woman from choosing to abort, it is making a normative statement.
It is asserting that once a fetus is viable a state ought to have the right to protect its interests even though such an
intervention burdens the woman's right to make procreative choices. There is no experiment that can be done to
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emptied of all moral considerations not specifically incorporated into the official
standards and related legal enactments.
Law, according to Simon's interpretation of legal positivism, is supposed to
supplant morality. Consequently, a lawyers' ethical duties are determined solely
by legal and never by general moral considerations. The law of the profession,
as reflected in the ethical standards of the profession, primarily the Code and
the Rules,113 are interpreted on this basis. These standards are supposed to be
the exclusive source of ethical professional guidance, devoid of moral content.
When they are unclear or leave discretion, 114 accordingly, the lawyer is sup-
posed to be free of further moral responsibility. 1 5
Simon's conception of the positivist perspective on lawyering, which he
terms the "ideology of advocacy," 16 has a number of significant consequences
for the life of a lawyer. Excluding considerations of morality from lawyering
turns lawyers into mere predictors of what courts will do: "The lawyer's various
other services as advocate are all ancillary to this basic task of prediction. In
litigation, he simply sets in motion the system which vindicates (or refutes) his
prior predictions. 1 17 As a kind of primitive social scientist, lawyers merely ex-
amine what courts did in the past and use this information to calculate what
they are likely to do in the future. The "ideology of advocacy" reduces legal
advocacy to doing whatever will be effective rather than what is right in law or
morals. Therefore, lawyers use moral rhetoric solely in the interest of persuasion
and without regard to considerations of justice. The truth or rightness of what is
said becomes irrelevant. The only issue is whether the lawyer can convince the
judge to adopt her point of view. The "ideology of advocacy" directs lawyers to
detach themselves from responsibility for the moral consequences of their cli-
ents' goals. Positivist lawyers, as characterized by Simon, thus have no duty to
evaluate the justice of their clients' ends nor bear any responsibility for any
moral harms caused by their efforts to achieve those ends. Lawyers function as
legal technicians whose sole obligation is to accomplish their clients'
purposes." 8
determine whether or not this view is correct. It is based simply on considerations of policy. e.g.. viability provides
a "bright line" boundary, or principle, e.g.. "it is wrong to abort post-viable fetuses because of their close resem-
blance to babies." On the other hand, when the Supreme Court requires that women who are minors can be
restricted in ways adult women cannot because of differences in their capacities to make procreative choices
unaided by their parents, the Court is making a descriptive statement, whose truth or falsity can be determined by
collecting the relevant empirical data.
113. See supra note 33.
114. Simon in his 1988 article empties the standards even further by claiming they do not even permit
discretion but only openings for the exercise of private norms which are standardless and nonreviewable. Simon
1988, supra note II. at 1090.
115. This accounts for the criticisms discussed supra notes 34-69. 84-105 and accompanying text. The princi-
ple of moral nonaccountability and the principle of partisanship.
116. See Simon 1978, supra note 1l1 passim.
117. Id. at 41.
118. "'tIt is often appropriate and many times even obligatory for ... the lawyer [to be] an amoral techni-
cian." Wasserstrom. supra note 13. at 5-6.
1991] LEGAL ETHICS
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:551
B. Critique of the Argument from Positivism
Simon's role-differentiation critique, followed by most other critics, is
founded on this mistaken understanding of legal positivism. 119 It is the premise
that leads to characterizing the ethical standards of the profession as effectively
legislating a conception of lawyering devoid of morality. By demonstrating that
the jurisprudential foundation of the role-differentiation thesis is essentially
flawed, this section will show that the resulting edifice-the "standard concep-
tion of lawyering"-cannot be maintained.
The central tenet of role-differentiation jurisprudence-that "the ideology
of advocacy" posits a total divide between law and morals-is simply mistaken.
Rather, legal positivism asserts that there is no necessary connection between
law and morals-not that there is no connection. 2" Positivists from Bentham to
Austin to Hart to Raz insist that law should be and often is moral.121 But law's
failure to be moral does not make it something other than law. As Hart wrote
in his definitive statement:
What both Bentham and Austin were anxious to assert were the following two simple
things: first, in the absence of an expressed constitutional or legal provision, it could
not follow from the mere fact that a rule violated standards of morality that it was not
a rule of law; and, conversely, it could not follow from the mere fact that a rule was
morally desirable that it was a rule of law.
122
Of course entire legal regimes have existed and do exist where law has little to
do with morals. Legal regimes such as the Nazi rule in Germany and the now
disintegrating system of apartheid in South Africa are evil legal systems, but
for positivists they are legal systems, nonetheless. 22 Far from deprivileging
119. Simon 1978, supra note II. at 39-42. Simon is in good company in making this error since H.L.A. Hart
in a footnote points out the recantation of Karl Llewellyn:
In the first edition of THE BRAMBLE BUSH, Professor Llewellyn committed himself wholeheartedly to the
view that "what these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself", and that "rules . . . are
important so far as they help you . . . predict what judges will do. . . . That is all their importance.
except as pretty playthings." In the second edition he said that these were "unhappy words when not more
fully developed, and they are plainly at best a very partial statement of the whole truth. . . . [O]ne office
of law is to control officials in some part, and to guide them even . . . where no thoroughgoing control is
possible, or is desired . . . . [T]he words fail to take proper account . . . of the office of the institution of
law as an instrument of conscious shaping .... "
H.L.A. HART, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHIL.OSOPIY
71 n.40 (1983) (citations omitted) [hereinafter ESSAYs]. Simon has yet to recant.
120. CONCEPT. supra note 42, at 181-207, ESSAYS, supra note 119, at 49; AUTHORITY, supra note 38. at 37-
163.
121. Hart points out that "Austin spoke of the 'frequent coincidence' of positive law and morality and attrib-
uted the confusion of what law is with what law ought to be to this very fact." ESSAYS, supra note 119. at 54 n.18
(quoting J. AUSTIN. ThE PROVIDENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 162 (Library of Ideas ed. 1954)). More-
over. Hart notes that "neither Bentham nor his followers denied that by explicit legal provisions moral principles
might at different points be brought into a legal system and form part of its rules, or that courts might be legally
bound to decide in accordance with what they thought just or best." Id. at 54-55.
122. ESSAYS. supra note 119, at 55.
123.
A concept of law which allows the invalidity of law to be distinguished from its immorality, enables us to
see the complexity and variety of these separate issues. whereas a narrow concept of law which denies
legal validity to iniquitous rules may blind us to them. It may be conceded that the German informers.
who for selfish ends, procured the punishment of others under monstrous laws, did what morality forbad.
yet morality may also demand that the state should punish only those who. in doing evil, did what the
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morals, positivism's effort to separate the law as it is from the law as it ought to
be creates a standpoint from which to criticize the law when it is unjust. 124
For a legal positivist, law and morals can have three significant relation-
ships relevant to the present discussion. First, to a significant extent law and
morals may overlap with one another. Thus, the law against murder parallels an
almost identical moral prohibition. Second, the law may incorporate moral con-
cepts and standards by express reference. For example, American criminal law
generally requires blameworthiness for conduct to be subject to criminal penal-
ties.1 25 Third, the law may leave a person with discretion together with a per-
mission to use that discretion for moral reasons. State bar committees on admis-
sions to practice have such discretion in the "good moral character"
requirement. 26
The official standards of professional ethics have moral content in all three
ways. First, both the moral law and the professional law generally prohibit
stealing. The standards do not simply declare "thou shalt not steal" but care-
fully limit the conditions under which an attorney may, for example, engage in
financial dealings with a client.1 27  They copy and elaborate on a moral
principle.
state at the time forbad. This is the principle of nulla poena sine lege. If inroads have to be made on this
principle in order to avert something held to be a greater evil than its sacrifice, it is vital that the issues at
stake be clearly identified. A case of retroactive punishment should not be made to look like an ordinary
case of punishment for an act illegal at the time. At least it can be claimed for the simple positivist
doctrine that morally iniquitous rules may still be law, that this offers no disguise for the choice between
evils which, in extreme circumstances. may have to be made.
CoNCEPT, supra note 42, at 207.
124.
Surely if we have learned anything from the history of morals it is that the thing to do with a moral
quandary is not to hide it. Like nettles, the occasions when life forces us to choose the lesser of two evils
must be grasped with the consciousness that they are what they are. The vice of this use or the principle
that, at certain limiting points, what is utterly immoral cannot be law or lawful is that it will serve to
cloak the true nature of the problems with which we are faced and will encourage the romantic optimism
that all the values we cherish ultimately will fit into a single system, that no one of them has to be
sacrificed or compromised to accommodate another. . . . This is surely untrue.. . . If with the Utilitari-
ans we speak plainly, we say that laws may be law but too evil to be obeyed. This is a moral condemnation
which everyone can understand and it makes an immediate and obvious claim to moral attention. If, on
the other hand, we formulate our objection as an assertion that these evil things are not law, here is an
assertion which many people do not believe, and if they are disposed to consider it at all, it would seem to
raise a whole host of philosophical issues before it can be accepted. . . . [Wihen we have the ample
resources of plain speech we must not present the moral criticism of institutions as propositions of a
disputable philosophy.
ESSAYS. supra note 119, at 77-78.
125. Thus, strict liability crimes are rare since such crimes impose liability without fault. W. LAK-AVE & A.
Storr. CRIMINAL LAW 242-43 (1986).
126. Thus, the Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners provides that the
lawyer licensing process is incomplete if only testing for minimal competence is undertaken. The public is
inadequately protected by a system that fails to evaluate character and fitness as those elements relate to
the practice of law. The public interest requires that the public be secure in its expectation that those who
are admitted to the bar are worthy or the trust and confidence clients may reasonably place in their
lawyers.
A Review of Legal Education in the United States. Fall. 1989. Law Schools and Bar Admission Requirements 72
(1990) (A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR).
127. For example, DR 5-104(A) provides that lawyers "shall not enter into a business transaction with a
client ir they have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judg-
ment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure." CODE, supra
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Second, the duty of loyalty exemplifies a requirement of professional ethics
that arguably incorporates morals into the official rules. Thus, the good person/
good lawyer question that is the foundation for role-differentiation analyses of
professional ethics may as readily stem from conflicts between different moral
principles as from conflicts between reasons for action derived from morals and
from law. Which kind of conflict is at issue may simply be a function of the
terms of analysis. For instance, a conflict between the moral principle, do not do
harm, and the legal principle, be loyal to one's client, can as readily be charac-
terized as a conflict between two moral principles, do not do harm and keep
one's promises.
Third, much of both the Code and the Rules provide lawyers with opportu-
nities to decide for themselves whether or not to take a particular action. For
example, the exercise of discretion is provided for in the standards regarding
withdrawal from representation. 1 28 Perhaps the aspect of the standards that
most dramatically illustrates the centrality of permissiveness and the opportu-
nity for exercising one's own moral judgments relates to the question of re-
vealing the intentions of a client to commit a future crime. Both the Code,
expansively,"29 and the Rules, more narrowly,"10 permit such revelations at the
discretion of the attorney. Role-differentiation critics, by treating the official
standards of professional ethics as exclusive standards, regard them as function-
ing as mandatory legal rules without room for the exercise of personal, relevant
moral judgments. But many are permissive and thus allow a role for morality in
their application.
Positivism's insistence that law and morality inhabit conceptually indepen-
dent yet often related domains preserves useful distinctions among law, politics
and morals which help make it possible for us to function as a pluralistic de-
mocracy. 3 Thus, for example, women who are religious Catholics can decide
for themselves not to have an abortion because they feel personally that such a
note 32, DR 5-104(A). The Rules are more elaborate than the Code in seeking to limit and control financial
transactions between attorney and client. See. e.g., RULES, supra note 32. Rule 1.8. which among other things, at
(c) flatly prohibits a lawyer from writing a will which might benefit the lawyer unless the lawyer is related to the
testator.
128. Thus section (b) of Rule 1.16 provides for permissive withdrawal under a range of circumstances includ-
ing that "'(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent."
RuL.s, supra note 32, Rule 1.16(b)(3). Comparable provision is made in the Code. CODE, supra note 32. DR 2-
110(c).
129. DR 4-lO(C)(3) provides that a lawyer "'may reveal ... [t]he intention of his client to commit a crime
and the information necessary to prevent the crime." CODE. supra note 32, DR 4-101(C)(3) (emphasis added).
Notice that the option of revelation exists regardless of the seriousness of the proposed crime.
130. Rule 1.6(b)(1) provides that a "lawyer may reveal [confidential] information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.'" RULES, supra note 32, Rule 1.6(b)(1).
131. Rawls. Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 Pint. & PUB. AFF. 223, 246 (1985).
[Tlrue liberalism requires . . . a distinction between what justifies individual belief and what justifies
appealing to that belief in support of the exercise of political power .... [L]iberalism should provide the
devout with a reason for tolerance.
[Tlhere is a highest-order framework of moral reasoning . . . which takes us outside ourselves to a stand-
point that is independent of who we are.
[Wihen we look at certain of our convictions from outside, however justified they may be from within, the
appeal to their truth must be seen merely as an appeal to our beliefs, and should be treated as such unless
those beliefs can be shown to be justifiable from a more impersonal standpoint.
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decision would be morally wrong while at the same time recognizing and ac-
cepting the legal right of other women to make such choices without state
interference.1 32
Far from deprivileging morals, positivism's effort to separate the law as it
is from the law as it ought to be creates a standpoint from which to criticize law
when it is unjust. It does not confuse law with good law. Positivism, just be-
cause it does separate law and morals and distinguishes law from good law,
encourages the thoughtful lawyer to ask, "even though the law permits me to do
this action, what ought I to do?"'133 If one regularly decides one ought to act
contrary to some particular law of the profession; or if some standard provides
reasons for action that cannot be justified, then that law needs to be changed.
Positivism simply does not prescribe a blind adherence to the law, as the "ideol-
ogy of advocacy" contends. Rather, the standpoint of criticism offered by sepa-
rating law and morals can lead to attempts to reform the professional standards
and to principled disobedience. It also gives lawyers the capacity to decide to
withdraw from a morally repugnant representation or even from the profession
itself. Positivism would not preclude lawyers, and in some circumstances might
even encourage them, to foment a professional revolution.
Sometimes lawyers and the profession make mistakes and deserve criti-
cism, but critics of the role-differentiation thesis do not make such a narrow
criticism. They impugn the morality of professionalism itself by claiming that
We accept a kind of epistemological division between the private and the public domains: in certain con-
texts I am constrained to consider my beliefs merely as beliefs rather than as truths, however convinced I
may be that they are true, and that I know it. This is not the same thing as skepticism. Of course if I
believe something I believe it to be true. I can recognize the possibility that what I believe may be false,
but I cannot with respect to any particular present belief of mine think that possibility is realized. Never-
theless, it is possible to separate my attitude toward my belief from my attitude toward the thing believed,
and to refer to my belief alone rather than to its truth in certain contexts of justification.
Nagel, supra note 67. at 229-31 (footnote omitted).
132. Rudolph Guiliani. a Republican candidate for Mayor of New York City, issued a statement about
abortion through his press secretary that "although the former federal prosecutor, who is a Roman Catholic.
opposed abortions due to his religious and moral views, as mayor he would continue to fund all abortion services
that are currently provided." N.Y. Times, July 6, 1989, at B1 & B5. Mario Cuomo, the Democratic Governor of
New York state is reported as
sending a strong message to proponents of abortion . . . that he would reject legislation limiting abortion
in ways sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court on Monday. The Governor. a Roman Catholic
who has often spoken about his efforts to reconcile his position on abortion with the teachings of the
Church. said nothing in the Supreme Court decision had changed his opinion "about the right to abortion
or the right of poor people to receive funding."
N.Y. Times, Aug. 6. 1989, at Al.
133. Hart criticizes a German writer for the
extraordinary naivety [of his) view that insensitiveness to the demands of morality and subservience to
state power in a people like the Germans should have arisen from the belief that law might be law though
it failed to conform with the minimum requirements of morality. Rather this terrible history prompts
inquiry into why emphasis on the slogan "law is law," and the distinction between law and morals, ac-
quired a sinister character in Germany. but elsewhere, as with the Utilitarians themselves, went along
with the most enlightened liberal attitudes. . . . [Elverything that he says is really dependent upon an
enormous overvaluation of the importance of the bare fact that a rule may be said to be a valid rule of
law. As if this. once declared, was conclusive of the final moral question: "Ought this rule of law to be
obeyed?" Surely the truly liberal answer to any sinister use of the. . .distinction between law and morals
is. "very well. but that does not conclude the question. Law is not morality, do not let it supplant
morality."
EssAYs, supra note 119, at 74-75.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
positivism through the "ideology of advocacy" obliterates any function for mo-
rality in professional ethics. It may be that part of this error is attributable to
confusing the empiricism of Oliver Wendell Holmes with the legal positivism of
H.L.A. Hart.
Holmes did characterize law as solely a matter of prediction about the ap-
plication of state coercion.1 34 For Holmes, law is directed at the bad man:
You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing
to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore you can see the practical
importance of the distinction between morality and law. A man who cares nothing for
an ethical rule which is believed and practiced by his neighbors is likely nevertheless
to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of
jail if he can. 38
In contrast, Hart's approach to law is richly normative while still preserv-
ing respect for the advantages of distinguishing law as it is from law as it ought
to be. The kind of account of law favored by Holmes and wrongly attributed by
the "ideology of advocacy" to positivism 136 is rejected by Hart. Law is not
merely understood in coercive terms as the command of a sovereign backed by
force:
It is easy to see that this account of a legal system is threadbare. One can also see why
it might seem that its inadequacy is due to the omission of some essential connection
with morality. The situation which the simple trilogy of command, sanction, and sov-
ereign avails to describe, if you take these notions at all precisely, is like that of a
gunman saying to his victim, "Give me your money or your life." The only difference
is that in the case of a legal system the gunman says it to a large number of people
who are accustomed to the racket and habitually surrender to it. Law surely is not the
gunman situation writ large, and legal order is surely not to be thus simply identified
with compulsion.1
37
Ethics is not a predictive social science any more than is law. 138 It deals
with questions of right and wrong and is normative rather than empirical. It
does not depend on theories about the relationships between observable stimuli
and responses which can be measured. It is practical. Ethics, itself, is a process
of reasoning, in particular circumstances, about what one ought to do, what
actions one should take. Guidance in such deliberations may be sought from
law, religion, morals, politics or other sources to supply the content, the reasons
for action, that determine one's ethical choices. In some situations, the law and
134. "'The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through
the instrumentality of the courts ... the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more preten-
tious. are what I mean by the law.'" Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897).
135. Id. at 459.
136. And, in turn, wrongly attributed to the standards of the profession. "-[T]he Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility is not designed for Holmes' proverbial 'bad man' who wants to know just how many corners he may
cut, how close to the line he may play without running into trouble with the law." General Motors Corp. v. City of
New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974).
137. ESSAYS, supra note 119, at 59.
138. For both ethics and law, the social sciences can provide information about, for example, what reasons
people give for different moral decisions or the consequences of different laws on various interpersonal arrange-
ments. This information may, in turn, have some impact on moral or legal decision making, but it does not tell
decision makers what they ought to do either morally or legally.
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common morality1 39 often may offer entirely compatible reasons for action.
However, on occasion, their guidance will conflict, just as different moral princi-
ples may conflict with one another in particular circumstances.
Role-differentiation critics thus have constructed their understanding of
what constitutes the standard conception of lawyering on a mistaken jurispru-
dence. They wrongly treat the concern of legal positivists to retain the concep-
tual distinction between law and morals as a determination to expunge all
normativity from the law. This mistaken jurisprudential framework is the un-
derlying structure upon which the criticisms of the law of lawyering are based.
Part I demonstrated that the arguments from moral nonaccountability and par-
tisanship fail on their own terms. This Part shows that the very foundation of
the critics' analysis fails to stand up to close inspection because it does not rec-
ognize the ways in which positivism makes room for moral consideration.40
III. THE INTEGRITY THESIS
In this final Part, the integrity thesis proposes a standard conception of
lawyering which allows for the separation of law and morals under the Code
and the Rules. Ethical lawyers can find ample room to have integrity when
acting as lawyers within this standard conception. Section A examines the role
of character which predisposes attorneys to read the standards either to find
ethical guidance or to evade constraints on self-interest whenever possible. The
integrity thesis reads the standards as they are addressed to those seeking ethi-
cal guidance-persons of good character-presumably including those who sit
on bar disciplinary committees. Sections B and C posit two principles to explain
how good readers can interpret the standards and maintain their integrity-the
Normativity Principle and the Principle of Integrative Positivism.
A. Reading the Standards
1. Good and Bad Readers
The professional ethical standards are addressed to adult readers with al-
ready formed characters that may or may not dispose them to being persons of
virtue. To draw too sharp a distinction for expositional purposes, persons of
good character need no rules to have dispositions for acting ethically. However,
they may benefit from the guidance that a good set of rules provide. The law of
lawyering is designed to be read, first, by lawyers with good character who are
disposed to be good lawyers. Such persons meet the good reader' 4 ' requirement
139. The term common morality is used here consistent with Luban's contrasting role morality and common
morality. LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5. at 105-07. It refers to what people conventionally agree is the
right or good thing to do in contrast to critical morality, which is understood to be what the right or good may
really be, although we may be unable to actually know it.
140. In contrast, the Principle of Integrative Positivism, discussed infra at notes 177-219 will demonstrate
how moral and legal considerations relate to one another and contribute to reading the standards with integrity.
141. Compare James Boyd Whites "ideal reader":
As we work through a text, we are thus always asking who the "ideal reader" of this text is . . . [In
contrast to a literary text], the legal text is authoritative. Whether you like it or not, as the reader of a
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by seeking to read a text honestly and implement it fairly. 142 For good readers,
the integrity thesis proposes a way of understanding the standards agreeably
with their characters. In contrast, persons of bad character will not be induced
to act as persons of virtue simply by providing them with a set of rules. They
will read the rules as Holmes' bad man1 3 or Luban's instrumental lawyer1 44
would, in search of the limits to what they can get away with. Lawyers with less
admirable dispositions must be controlled by the coercive power of the law
rather than the guiding content of the rules. For these readers of the standards,
the rules provide for sanctions and hence prudential reasons to act as required.
Since the bad reader "has as much reason as a good one for wishing to
avoid an encounter with the public force,"'145 the law of lawyering must be more
than merely hortatory. It must be enforced. The bar itself may discipline its
members and thus provide a remedy for deficiencies in lawyering by punishing
and deterring unethical conduct. Sanctions that may be levied in such circum-
stances can range from private censure to suspension and ultimately to disbar-
ment.146 Of course, to be effective such discipline of attorneys who violate the
standards must occur regularly."'4  There is ample evidence to suggest that this
statute, contract, trust, or judicial opinion you are in the first instance its servant, seeking to make real
what it directs. But its authority is not unquestioned. When the text is once understood, it is checked, not
only against other parts of the reader's being-other standards and sentiments and wishes-but against
other parts of the literature of the law. How does this text, so read, fit within the larger legal culture?...
There is a sense in which no text is great except as it is made so by readers who perceive its possibilities.
. . . Accordingly, the "ideal reader" remains a useful idea in reading law .... Instead of asking what a
statute, opinion, or constitutional provision "means," as if we expected a one-sentence response, we can
ask what it means in a different way: How would the ideal reader contemplated by this document, indeed.
constituted by it, understand its bearing in the present circumstances?
J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 270-71 (1984). See also, R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
"According to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice.
fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community's legal
practice." Id. at 225.
142. By definition, such a reading entails integrity which is defined as "soundness of moral principle...
especially in relation to truth and fair dealing." THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
368 (1981).
143. See supra text accompanying note 135.
144. See supra text accompanying note 78.
145. See supra text accompanying note 135 for Holmes' description.
146. GILLERS & DORSEN, supra note 100, at 287-89.
147. Thus, commentary [I] to Rule 8.3 on "Reporting Professional Misconduct" notes:
Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investi-
gation when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct .... An apparently isolated
violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Report-
ing a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.
RULES, supra note 32, Rule 8.3 (commentary [1]). However, the Rule and the commentary acknowledge that
reporting should be focused on significant and not mere technical violations. "[3] ... This Rule limits the report-
ing obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A measure of
judgment is, therefore, required in complying with the provisions of this Rule." S. GILLERS & R. SIMON, supra
note 33, at 188. Sanctions that result from such discipline must also be made known to be effective deterrents to
unethical practices, particularly to other members of the profession, and, arguably, to members of the public. In
many states, the results of grievance procedures are required to be kept confidential by the professional ethics
rules. For example, Florida Rule 3.7-1 requires most such matters to be kept confidential. However, a recent case
declared such a requirement violates the first amendment. Doe v. Florida Supreme Court, 58 U.S.L.W. 2465
(Feb. 20, 1990).
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is not the case, and that the profession has been derelict in this regard.," 8 There
are also private remedies that individuals can invoke to penalize some unethical
practices, such as malpractice actions. 149 Moreover, there is evidence of clients'
increasing recourse to and success in bringing such actions.1
5 0
2. The Good Reader Reads the Standards with Integrity
The capacity to apply moral principles fairly and honestly is founded on
good character and is essential to being a good lawyer. The significance of good
character is recognized by the professional standards in the good character re-
quirement for admission to the bar.15' Thus, the good reader must first be a
person of good character who is capable of interpreting the law of lawyering
consistently with moral principles.
Good lawyers are good readers of the standards; they read the rules with a
commitment to probity. Good lawyers are also effective advocates in part be-
cause they are honest persons. After all, the ability to evaluate the credibility of
others, such as a witness, is a key factor in good lawyering.' 5' There certainly
may be a few clients and a few witnesses who fool everybody about their hon-
esty. However, the ability of a lawyer to evaluate another person's veracity re-
quires a blend of intuition and experience that cannot be achieved by someone
who does not him- or herself have an internalized understanding of what it
means to be an honest person. Basically honest persons may choose on occasion
to act dishonestly, but they know that this is what they are doing. This does not
148. "Enforcement has proved weakest in the areas of greatest concern to clients: inattention, incompetence,
delay, client property, and fee abuses." Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 953, 958. Before discipline can be imposed, violations must be reported. Other lawyers are in the best
position to make such reports, but they are loath to do so. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comm. on Grievance Procedures,
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Report on the Grievance System 41 (1976) (analyzes infrequency of com-
plaints by attorneys against other attorneys); Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who
Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1989); Green, Through a Glass Darkly. How the
Court Sees Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201 (1989); Lynch, The
Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491; Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is it Self-
Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L. REV. 193, 201; Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyers Unethical
Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 1977; Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to
Report Other Lawyers' Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95; Note, The
Lawyer's Duty to Report Professional Misconduct, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 509 (1978). Rule 8.3 narrows the Code's
requirement at DR 1-103(A) on lawyer reporting of misconduct by fellow attorneys. Lawyers are required to
report professional misconduct under the rule that "raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as lawyer." RULES, supra note 32, Rule 8.3. Enforcement of the disciplinary rule report-
ing requirement was apparently virtually nonexistent. "[A] general reporting rule would be subject to massive civil
disobedience that would in turn make it difficult to prosecute even clearcut and egregious cases. The compromise
limits the rule to cases of known violations that directly implicate the integrity of the legal profession." HAZARD
& HODES, supra note 51, at 939.
149. GILLERS & DORSEN, supra note 100, at 243-73; Underwood, Taking And Pursuing a Case: Some Ob-
servations Regarding 'Legal Ethics' And Attorney Accounts, 74 Ky. L.J. 173 (1985-86).
150. Dahlquist. The Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage Actions Against Attorneys, 9
OHIO N.U.L. REV. I (1982) (from 1970 to 1975 the number of successful malpractice claims against attorneys
increased by 25%).
151. Thus, the Code at EC 1-3 admonishes: "Before recommending an applicant for admission, a lawyer
should satisfy himself that the applicant is of good moral character." Commentary to Canon I of the Code em-
phasizes that "good character in the members of the bar is essential to the preservation of the integrity of the
courts." SELECTED STATUTES, supra note 60, at 5 n.2.
152. My appreciation to Kate Waits and Marty Belsky for stimulating this insight.
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mean that the circumstances of lawyering may not sometimes or even often
create difficult choices among competing worthwhile values. And basically fair
and honest lawyers may occasionally make bad choices. Human goodness is
fragile and all humans may err on occasion.5
Given that lawyers may be just as frail as the rest of humanity when it
comes to acting always for good reasons, it is important to understand what
constitutes living a life of good character. Persons of good character are dis-
posed both to recognize and to choose that which is good or right15' when en-
gaged in the process of practical reasoning. Volumes of philosophy have been
devoted to this subject.1 55 Only a brief sketch can be attempted here.15  The
capacity for practical reason, a function critical to good character, is not a skill
like mathematical computation, which is learned as a set of rules to be applied
scientifically to a problem from the point of view of an impartial reader. It is
more like the ability to perceive when a painting is beautiful or well done.1 57
"[I]t is, centrally, the ability to recognize, acknowledge, respond to, pick out
certain salient features of a complex situation .... [I]t is gained only through a
long process of living and choosing that develops the agent's resourcefulness and
responsiveness."'15  On those occasions when the person of good character is
153. Martha Nussbaum has beautifully portrayed the fragility of human goodness:
That I am an agent, but also a plant; that much that I did not make goes towards making me whatever I
shall be praised or blamed for being; that I must constantly choose among competing and apparently
incommensurable goods and that circumstances may force me to a position in which I cannot help being
false to something or doing some wrong; that an event that simply happens to me may, without my
consent, alter my life; that it is equally problematic to entrust one's goods to friends, lovers, or country
and to try to have a good life without them-all these I take to be not just the material of tragedy, but
everyday facts of lived practical reason.
NUSSBAUM, supra note 35, at 5.
154. Both good and right are used since I do not wish to get into the complicated philosophical history of the
differences between the two and which should be preferred as a guide to ethical choices. See, e.g., W.D. Ross,
THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (Hackett Publishing ed. 1988) (Right applies to acts that are morally obligatory as
distinct from morally good, which is broader, e.g., applies to persons. Right refers to the thing done while morally
good to the motive from which it is done.); I. MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD (1985); Rawls, The Prior-
fly of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251 (1988) (The right and the good are complemen-
tary, but the right has priority. Worthy conceptions of the good, those that respect the principles of justice, should
be treated neutrally by the state and thus all citizens are free to affirm any such conception without either being
assisted or hampered by the state.).
155. The starting point for this tradition is ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Welldon trans. 1987).
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 135, for a contemporary treatment.
156. This is based on Martha Nussbaum's presentation of the philosophy of Aristotle in NUSSBAUM supra
note 35. The other major philosophical school which has addressed practical reason is based on the work of the
German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, whose focus is on reasoning rather than on character. See, e.g., I. KANT.
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (L. Beck trans. 1956); I. KANT FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS, supra note 41.
157.
Art transcends selfish and obsessive limitations of personality and can enlarge the sensibility of its con-
sumer. It is a kind of goodness by proxy. Most of all it exhibits to us the connection, in human beings, of
clear realistic vision with compassion. The realism of a great artist is not a photographic realism, it is
essentially both pity and justice . . . . [H]uman life is chancy and incomplete. It is the role ...of
painting to show us suffering without a thrill and death without a consolation. Or if there is any consola-
tion it is the austere consolation of a beauty which teaches that nothing in life is of any value except the
attempt to be virtuous.
I. MURDOCH, supra note 154, at 87.
158. NUSSBAUM, supra note 35, at 305.
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faced with a moral quandary, she must puzzle out the right course of action by
means of her capacity to think and reason about moral values.
This capacity to grasp what is good or right1 59 is a quality of personhood
which disposes one to appreciate and make virtuous choices. It is achieved
through a process of moral instruction that involves both reason and passion-
that is, it is both cognitive and emotional. It results in "a reverence for a plural-
ity of values, for stable character, and for the shared conventions of which char-
acter, through moral education, is the internalization. 1 60
Thus, one's character is the foundation upon which one builds lawyering
skills. Good character cannot be created by professional training. The person
who undertakes to become an attorney must approach the law disposed to be-
coming a good lawyer sensible to the daily process of practical deliberation re-
quired to live a life in the law of integrity."'
B. The Normativity Principle
Even if the good lawyer is disposed to be virtuous, however, it remains to
be demonstrated that the law of lawyering has any special claim of authority
for such persons.' 62 The Normativity Principle holds that lawyers are a special
class of citizens whose membership in the legal profession provides them with a
prima facie'13 obligation to obey the law of lawyering.
Contemporary political philosophers reject the earlier view that law, just
because it is law, ought to be obeyed. 164 However, they still recognize that some
laws are obligatory for some classes of people.' 65 The integrity thesis maintains
that the law of lawyering has normative force for lawyers. The relationship be-
tween attorneys and the law that regulates them as professionals provides a
special case distinguishable from the general issue of whether any citizen is
obligated to obey the law.
Lawyers are specially obligated to obey the law of lawyering for two re-
lated reasons. First, membership in the legal profession provides access to a
state authorized and regulated monopoly that provides economic, intellectual,
and other personal benefits to persons licensed to practice law. By accepting a.nd
159. Attempting to further analyze values like good and right, although appropriate for philosophers, eventu-
ally comes down to that which cannot be spoken. "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." L.
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 189 (D. Pears & B. McGuiness trans. 1961).
160. NUSSBAUM, supra note 35, at 310.
161. Kronman, supra note 31.
162. After all, there are those who claim that professional regulations are designed primarily to shield attor-
neys from public accountability and contribute to the monopoly over legal services that simply serves to enrich
lawyers. See, e.g., Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model
Rules. 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 243, 275 (1985).
163. For a discussion of the different meanings of "prima facie" in philosophy and law, see Smith, Is There a
Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950, 952 (1973).
164. See, e.g., J. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 97-105 (1986); Smith, supra note 163; Symposium in
Honor of A.D. Woozley: Law and Obedience, 67 VA. L. REV. 3-248 (1981); Symposium: The Duty to Obey the
Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 727-966 (1984).
165. This would include that rather small group of persons who directly consent to be obligated to obey the
law, for example, judges. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 163, at 960-61. For a discussion of the centrality of consent
to the adoption of a set of rules by a community, see Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL.
Q. 127, 133 (1987).
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enjoying these benefits, attorneys incur concomitant special obligations. One of
these is the duty to obey the law of lawyering. Second, this is a duty undertaken
by consent. It is not imposed. When lawyers take a special oath upon admission
to the bar of a state, 6 " they voluntarily and knowingly6 7 agree to abide by the
regulations of the profession. Of course, this obligation to obey is a prima facie
reason for action which can be overridden by a lawyer's ultimate obligation to
promote just legal institutions when the professional rules are not just and ef-
forts to reform them fail.
The Normativity Principle recognizes that there are three consequences for
lawyers created by their membership in the bar. First, the ethical standards
adopted by the profession provide ethical guidance which normally should be
followed by members of the legal profession. However, their authority is rebut-
table. Second, they cannot be dismissed cavalierly as they have been by some of
the role-differentiation critics. They remain guidelines for action until their pre-
sumptive normative force is defeated by good reasons. Finally, the Normativity
Principle acknowledges that there may be other moral reasons that may over-
ride the standards' authority and lead appropriately to civil disobedience and
submission to sanctions.
By mandating certain actions, the standards tell persons serving as lawyers
that they should take the required action in these circumstances'68 because by
joining the bar they have agreed to follow the ethical guidelines developed by
the profession and given legal authority through adoption as law by the state
judiciary. 6 Moreover, given the complexity and time pressures of contempo-
rary legal practice, the standards may help lawyers on some occasions by reliev-
ing them of the need to think through every professional ethical question as it
arises in their practice. It would certainly be inefficient for every motorist to
think about the advantages of coordinating traffic patterns before deciding to
stop at a red light. However, the norms of practice do not exhaust the domain
of reasons for action to be pondered.
True dilemmas arise when the mandatory norms, which claim to pre-empt
the field of inquiry, support actions different from and arguably less preferable
than those directed by non-legal reasons. In so far as some actions have been
thus mandated by the professional standards, lawyers are precluded from inde-
pendently acting on these contrary reasons for action. But the Normativity
Principle, operating in tandem with the Principle of Integrative Positivism, rec-
ognizes that because the normative force of law and morals remain independent,
legal pre-emption does not necessarily include moral authority. At a minimum
166. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 56, at 849.
167. The knowing component is verified by the fact that most lawyers must take and pass a special ethics
examination, the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam (MPRE), in order to practice law. Thirty-seven
states require this examination. Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements 1990, 19 (Chart VI)
(A.B.A. SEc. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND THE NAT'L CONF B. EXAMINERS).
168. It is understood that some reasons are never right in any circumstances. These are usually what might
be termed ad hominem reasons-for example, reasons based on race, gender, or sexual orientation when these
qualities have no rational relationship to determining one's actions.
169. See a description of process for making standards law in L.R. PATTERSON & T. METZLOFF, LEGAL
ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 57-107 (3d ed. 1989).
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attorneys may work to reform the objectionable norms. Acting contrary to a
mandatory norm, however, is still a violation. Its moral status will depend on
the reasons for taking the action. The bad reader who seeks personal and imper-
missible advantage should be subject to moral opprobrium and sanctioning. The
good reader,170 acting out of conscience, may be respected as a conscientious
objector but will still be subject to sanctions.
In addition to acknowledging the prima facie authority of the law of lawy-
ering, the Normativity Principle also obligates lawyers to consider when situa-
tions require them to use discretion and consider reasons for action based on
morals and other non-legal values. The permissive structure of some of the stan-
dards requires lawyers to consider for themselves what actions they ought to
take depending on their own moral values and prudential concerns. The signifi-
cant discretion thus provided bespeaks a commitment to fostering integrity in
good readers of the standards. Thus, the law of lawyering explicitly provides
that it is not the exclusive source of guidance when lawyers must decide what
they ought to do in particular professional situations. The Rules emphasize that
they do not "exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a
lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal
rules. The rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law. '171
The law of lawyering encourages attorneys to use moral standards to fill
the substantial indeterminacies left in the structure of professional ethics by
both the Rules and the Code. For example, the preamble to the Rules indicates:
"Within the framework of these Rules many difficult issues of professional dis-
cretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive
professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the
Rules."117  The Code states that the "[a]dvice of a lawyer to his client need not
be confined to solely legal considerations . . . . In assisting his client to reach a
proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors
which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally
permissible. '173
Readers of good character are deliberately left by the standards with the
responsibility for making some difficult ethical decisions because of the ways in
which the standards treat the relationship between law and morals. This per-
spective is cogently articulated by the legal ethicist Charles Wolfram in his
discussion of the more recently promulgated Model Rules:
170. In engaging in such a process of practical reasoning, good readers should also consider the process by
which the law of lawyering is created. The professional standards have been developed by the representatives of a
professional group, and the process of developing such standards is political and represents the views of generally
democratically selected members of the profession, although their representativeness may be subject to question.
For example, there are those who claim: "The membership. . . is being left increasingly to conservative, business-
oriented lawyers. ... A U.S. Judge Campaigns for the 'Soul' of the ABA, NAT'L L.J. 1, 10 (Oct. 28, 1985).
The standards are based on reasons which have sufficed to persuade a majority of such representatives that certain
standards are preferable to others. Morality, however, is a matter of determining what is the right action to take.
It is the best approximation of truth one can make for oneself and not a matter of voting for what one might wish
to be the case. It is personal and should not be subject to majority rule.
171. S. GILLERS & R. SIMON, supra note 33, at 8 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
173. CODnE, supra note 32, EC 7-8 (emphasis added).
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The refusal of the drafters of the Model Rules to engage in a drafting process in
which some lawyers would be required to yield to the view of others on matters of
personal morality implies that matters of conscience are too important to be logrolled
in the process of arriving at compromised statements of professional morality . . . . It
is a mistake to conclude that because a social order cannot legislate or form a consen-
sus upon moral issues, it is not meaningful for the individual members of that social
order to consider the morality of law or of personal choice.1 7 4
By acknowledging the relevance of morals in their texts and by couching
much of their guidance in permissive terms, the professional standards deliber-
ately make room for lawyers to exercise their discretion in determining what is
the right action for them to take independently of the law of lawyering. None-
theless, the role played by discretion in the standards does not and should not
swallow up the standards themselves. Much of the law of lawyering remains
mandatory. Although, even when the legal rules are clear, recognition that they
approximate what can be achieved politically in a particular time and place
may reinforce the decision of the hardy few to be conscientious objectors in
their self-determination.
Both bad and good readers of the standards are challenged by the permis-
sive structure of much of the standards. Bad readers must fill the gaps in guid-
ance by determining whether it is prudent to do nothing that is not required or
whether their self-interest lies in some action and what that may be. For exam-
ple, suppose a lawyer has a practice essentially defending drug dealers. He may
have a client who the lawyer knows is involved in continuing sales of marijuana
laced with a substance which can cause irreversible brain damage to those who
use it. Under the Rules, the lawyer would be permitted to reveal confidential
information about the client to "prevent the client from committing a criminal
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in . . . substantial bodily
harm.117 5 Not only might the bad reader decide to remain silent under these
circumstances but her reasons for doing so would be bad reasons like concern
for losing clients and fees. If her silence was determined by fear of reprisals by
the clients' friends and thus fear for her life, it would be harder to dismiss such
a reason and to label the lawyer a bad reader. Good readers are not foreclosed
from acting prudently, but the judgments they must make require even more.
They must also integrate and balance possibly competing legal, moral and pru-
dential reasons for action. The good reader who defends drug sellers might jus-
tify her silence by reference to some moral value like the centrality of confiden-
tiality to maintaining a relationship with the criminal client and affording that
client a fair representation under the conditions provided by the current adver-
sary system of justice.1 8
174. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 56, at 70.
175. RULES, supra note 32, Rule 1.6(b)(1).
176. There has been a lengthy debate in the legal ethics literature on the moral justification for the adversary
system. For example, the noted legal ethicist, Thomas Shaffer, contends that "the adversary ethic is a unique
claim of moral immunity for lawyers." Shaffer, The Unique. Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 697 (1988). See also Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985). On the
other hand, David Luban, one of the foremost critics of the adversary system, concludes in his recent book that at
least for questions of criminal culpability, which pit the weak individual against the strong state, and more gener-
ally for all such "David and Goliath" situations, it is better than any viable alternative in the present United
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C. The Principle of Integrative Positivism
Part II demonstrated that although law and morals are separate normative
domains, they very often are compatible with one another. Retaining the dis-
tinction between law as it is and law as it ought to be facilitates our capacity to
recognize and either change or reject evil laws. Nonetheless, so long as bad law
remains in force, it still has legal authority over those it governs. 17 The Princi-
ple of Integrative Positivism applies this perspective to the law of lawyering and
makes the following claims: (1) The ethical standards of the profession have
both legal and moral normative force for lawyers. (2) Lawyers thus are obli-
gated to obey the law of lawyering. (3) However, this is a prima facie obligation
which can be defeated by superior moral reasons. (4) Nonetheless, even if the
moral authority of some aspect of the standards is thus rebutted, it still retains
its legal power so those who disobey it may be sanctioned for their actions. (5)
Members of disciplinary committees have a duty to determine, always as good
readers, whether a standard has been violated and what the proper sanction
should be in light of the reasons the lawyer had for taking such a course of
action. (6) Individual attorneys must decide for themselves when, if ever, diso-
bedience is morally warranted. (7) In doing so they should engage in a reasons
for action analysis.
To facilitate making such an analysis, this section examines the ways in
which law and morals relate to one another within the law of lawyering. The
relationship of law and morals within the standards is complex.1 7 8 One way to
better understand it is in terms of the following four categories. First, situations
where the standards are permissive and hence provide the lawyer with discretion
to balance for him or herself reasons derived from law other than the standards,
morality and prudence. In addition, some of the law of lawyering provides
States. LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5. at 50-93. This author has long been a critic of the adversary system,
see. e.g., Slier & Hamilton. Teaching Divorce Mediation: Creating a Better Fit between FanilY Systems and the
Legal Systent. 48 ALB. L. REV. 693 (1984); Stier, Child Custody and Mediation, in CHILD CUSTODY & VIsITA-
TION LAW & PRACTICE, (Matthew Bender, 1987). Nonetheless. Luban's "pragmatic" justification for the adver-
sary system's existence under limited circumstances, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 5. at 92. should at least
be treated as a prima facie reason for its having value when a defense lawyer reasons about what to do about
maintaining client confidences.
177.
Does the morality, with which law must conform if it is to be good. mean the accepted morality of the
group whose law it is. even though this may rest on superstition or may withhold its benefits and protec-
tion from slaves or subject classes? Or does morality mean standards which are enlightened in the sense
that they rest on rational beliefs as to matters of fact, and accept all human beings as entitled to equal
consideration and respect? . . . If so, the enlightened morality which recognizes these rights has special
credentials as the true morality, and is not just one among many possible moralities. These are claims
which . . . cannot alter, and should not obscure, the fact that municipal legal systems . . . have long
endured though they have flouted these principles of justice.
CONCI-'T. supra note 42, at 201. By distinguishing law from morals, the professional standards, which regulate
the ethics of legal practice, acknowledge this problem and require lawyers to exercise independent moral choice in
deciding what to do in many professional situations.
178. The complex relations of law and morals more generally have been explored recently in Fletcher, The
Meaning of Morality. 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 805 (1989): Woodard, Thoughts on the Interplay Between
Morality, and Law in Modern Legal Thought, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 784 (1989).
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mandatory"7 9 rules which should be read in light of the Principle of Integrative
Positivism. For mandatory rules, the relationship of law and morals falls into
three additional categories: law and morals may overlap; the law may incorpo-
rate morals; and finally, law and morals may conflict.
1. Permissive Standards Providing for Moral Discretion
Much of the law of lawyering makes room for morals by giving lawyers
discretion in determining what they ought to do. The language of some stan-
dards is deliberately couched in permissive rather than mandatory terms. Thus,
lawyers "may reveal" certain categories of confidential information. 180 Such
language creates the kind of flexible regulation that leaves room for lawyers to
exercise their own discretion in balancing moral and prudential reasons for ac-
tion. Professor Wolfram points out:
Clearly, most lawyer decisions are open-ended and discretionary in the sense that a
lawyer can choose between a variety of tactics or outcomes with no fear of violating
any legal rule. In making those decisions, lawyers rely on some innate sense of proper
behavior. One lawyer's sense might be the result of a very well thought out and con-
sciously followed system of moral values. Another lawyer's sense might be nothing
more complicated than an instinct that a lawyer may engage in any conduct that leads
to a higher fee. Both lawyers are making moral decisions about the rightness or
wrongness of conduct. 81
Of course, the lawyer who is guided solely by the size of his or her fee is
acting for the wrong reason. Nonetheless, the professional standards in effect
may allow lawyers to do so by constructing regulations which are often permis-
179. Even mandatory standards may leave room for judgment calls, however. Hazard and Hodes give the
example of Rule 1.8(c) which
absolutely prohibits a lawyer from drafting an instrument in which he or she is to receive a "substantial"
gift from a client. The prohibition is not only absolute, but is reinforced by the absence of a provision
permitting a client to waive the protection of the Rule. On the other hand, the Rule does not apply at all if
the gift involved is not "substantial." A lawyer who is asked to draft an instrument in which he is to be
given a gift that is not trivial must therefore first make a "judgment call" about the substantiality of the
gift. A gift might be judged substantial or insubstantial depending upon the wealth of the donor, the
financial situation of the lawyer, or perhaps upon some a priori view of "substantiality" derived from
estate planning experience. Whatever judgment the lawyer makes, the process of making it will be a moral
dialogue with himself. The lawyer must ask himself: "Am I the kind of lawyer who. in a close case like
this one, will take advantage of the inherent ambiguities of language? Or am I the kind of person who will
err on the side of self-denial?" He will also ask himself such questions as: "What are the chances that
anyone will question my decision? What will be the consequences if the decision is questioned? What if
my decision is held to have been erroneous?" Conceiving the dialogue in this way does not necessarily
suggest the "right" answer, for other considerations-including some with moral overtones-may be rele-
vant. For example, a lawyer faced with the foregoing dilemma might legitimately tip the balance towards
accepting the gift if he believed that the client would be upset at the thought that there is any question of
his lawyer's honesty. Or the lawyer could rightly judge that the client would be annoyed at having to
waste time and money finding another lawyer to draft the document. On the other hand, the balance could
be tipped toward refusing to draft the document if the lawyer fears that a subsequent "undue influence"
lawsuit might be brought, even if such a suit would have little chance of success.
HAZARD & HoDEs. supra note 51, at 561. This example could easily be translated into a reasons for action
analysis. Under such an analysis, the prudential reasons cited at the conclusion-upsetting the client or risking a
lawsuit-do not seem to justify tipping the balance one way or the other.
180. RULES. supra note 32, Rule 1.6(b). In contrast, Rule 1.6(a) provides that a "lawyer shall not reveal
information ...." Id. at Rule 1.6(a) (emphasis added).
181. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 56, at 69.
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sive.' 8 ' Generally, it is up to the individual lawyer to balance various reasons for
action when his or her choice affects the attorney's personal integrity rather
than the integrity of the system of justice itself. When the justice system itself




Thus, both the Code and the Rules mandate the protection of client confi-
dences when they relate solely to past crimes and neither the lawyer nor a tribu-
nal is involved. This makes good sense since harm to third parties and society
has already occurred and cannot be rectified by allowing attorneys to breach
their duty of loyalty to their clients. However, information about future crimes
is another matter. Here the standards deliberately resort to permissive rather
than mandatory language. "A lawyer may reveal [confidential] information
• ..to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer be-
lieves is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."'' In
this instance, lawyers must take responsibility for their action or inaction.
182.
[Such] statements are equivalent to saying that one has no obligation either to perform it or to refrain
from it. or that one is required by law, or by morality, neither to perform nor to refrain from that action
.... Permissions play a special role in practical reasoning. Reasons for action impose practical con-
straints. constitute requirements to act in a certain way and not in others. Permissions indicate the ab-
sence of constraints. To state that one is permitted to act in a certain way is to say that one will not be
acting contrary to reason in doing so.
AUTHORITY. supra note 38. at 86. 89.
183. For example, lawyers are mandated by both the Code and the Rules to protect the confidences of clients
and arc forbidden to reveal information about past crimes that clients have admitted committing to their lawyers.
See Rui rs. supra note 32, Rule 1.6 and CODE, supra note 32, DR 4-101. Maintaining confidentiality in these
circumstances strengthens the bond of loyalty of attorney to client and thus, arguably, the capacity of the justice
system to perform its function. Nonetheless. the more recently promulgated and more widely adopted Rules man-
date an exception to such loyalty when it would undermine the truth-seeking function of a tribunal because of the
use of false evidence or failure to reveal adverse authority. Confidentiality must also be abrogated when it would
undermine the integrity of lawyer advocates by enlisting their services in misleading a tribunal. See RULES. supra
note 32. Rule 3.3. Hazard and Hodes point out that
Rule 3.3 is part of the package of Rules that speak to situations in which a lawyer may not be able to do
all that a client would like him to do. It is another reminder that there is no unqualified right to the
services of a lawyer. Rather, there is a right to assistance only if the lawyer's tasks can be accomplished
within the bounds of law.
HAZARD & HoDEs. supra note 51, at 349.
184. RULES. supra note 32. Rule 1.6(b)(1) (emphasis added). DR 4-10](C)(3) of the Code provides that a
*'lawyer may reveal . . . [t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent
the crime." CODE. supra note 32. DR 4-1O(C)(3). Hazard and Hodes argue that additional limits on the confi-
dentiality principle, proposed by the Kutak Commission but rejected by the ABA House of Delegates, "are so
necessary that they will almost certainly be read back into Rule 1.6. one way or another, by courts and practicing
lawyers.'" HAZARD & HODES, supra note 51, at 91. Both these exceptions, "disclosures in order to 'rectify' a
completed crime or fraud that the lawyer had unwittingly helped bring about, and disclosures needed to 'comply
with (other) law"' would strengthen the lawyer's integrity. Id. Hazard and Hodes point out that confidentiality
is intended not only to benefit present clients, but also to assure that fitture clients will freely confide in
counsel. In cases where a client uses an innocent lawyer to commit a crime or fraud, however, and the
misconduct is discovered by the lawyer, the lawyer should be allowed to rectify the harm, at the cost of
client confidences, precisely because it will teach fiture clients that they may not successfully use lawyers
in this fashion. If clients bent on fraud are "'chilled," so much the better .... Allowing lawyers to breach
the rule of confidentiality in order to rectify a completed fraud would diminish, to some extent, client
belief that confidentiality will be maintained in nonfraud situations. But providing complete assurance to
innocent clients can be achieved only by allowing exploitative clients to make the lawyer an instrument of
fraud and then prevent him from rectifying the harm. No amount of rhetoric about the sanctity of client
confidences can avoid the necessity for a trade-off between these consequences. Furthermore, no version of
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The standards recognize that weighing the reasons for and against protect-
ing the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship when a contemplated
crime is at issue requires a personal, case-by-case process, which permits each
lawyer to be the judge of his or her own circumstances. The ingredients of this
process will vary for good and bad readers. The latter will not include moral
considerations in their decision making. Good readers, however, are not pre-
cluded from ethically deciding to be prudent when permitted to do so. The Prin-
ciple of Integrative Positivism recognizes that attorneys can both preserve their
integrity and take actions which are personally advantageous so long as such
decisions are neither illegal nor immoral.1 85
2. Mandatory Standards: Legal and Moral Reasons Overlap and Pre-empt
Prudential Reasons
What should an associate in a law firm do when asked by a partner to sign
an amended pleading because doing so will give the firm leverage in their settle-
ment negotiations? The associate has a number of reasons to comply with this
request as well as other reasons to refuse it. One set of reasons relate to the
prudence of following the wishes of a superior. Thus, the fact the associate
wants to keep and advance in his or her job creates prudential reasons to com-
ply. There may also be an ethical obligation to give at least some deference to
the authority of the more senior and experienced attorney.188  In addition, in
light of both the professional and moral duty of loyalty, the associate has an
obligation to try and obtain the best possible settlement for the firm's client,
consistent with other obligations.
On the other hand, the professional ethical standards forbid making an
assertion that is frivolous. 187 The associate must judge whether or not amending
a pleading for tactical purposes would violate this prohibition.1 88 If it would,
there are federal and state court rules that also prohibit such actions and pro-
the rule of confidentiality actually requires that confidentiality be preserved at the cost of compelling
lawyers to be the instruments or fraud.
Id. at 92.
185. It would be both self-righteous and foolish to prescribe martyrdom as an essential ingredient of
integrity.
186. The authority of a supervising attorney is specifically recognized in the Rules, though not in the Code.
Rule 5.1(c)(2) holds a supervising attorney responsible for rule violations of subordinate attorneys, and Rule
5.2(b) provides that a "subordinate lawyer does not violate the rules or professional conduct if that lawyer acts in
accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty." Ru ts.
supra note 32, Rules 5.1(c)(2) and 5.2(b).
187. RuLEs, supra note 32, Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions). DR 7-102(A)(1) provides that a
lawyer may not "[flile a suit, assert a position ... when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another." Cf. Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know
Anything At All?, 24 OScOODE HALL L.J. 353 (1986).
188. The associate cannot pass the buck on this and take a "just following orders" position. Rule 5.2(a) on
the "Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer" provides: "A lawyer is bound by the rules of professional conduct
notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person." Rut-.s, supra note 32. Rule 5.2(a). The
commentary to this rule notes: "[l]f a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the
subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's
frivoulous character." S. GILLERS & R. SIMON, supra note 33, at 139. Does the comment vitiate the rule by




vide for monetary sanctions. 18 9 If the associate decides ultimately that it would
be wrong to sign the pleading as requested because it is frivolous then this deci-
sion would be supported by the congruence of both morals and law.190 Good
readers of the standards would have no conflict here since, under the Principle
of Integrative Positivism, prudential reasons for action are simply pre-empted
under this interpretation of these facts. Bad readers of the standards would be
faced with a problem since if they refuse to sign the frivolous pleading, they will
be subject to possible negative consequences by their superior. However, if they
go ahead and sign to avoid punishment within the firm, they may face sanction-
ing by a court. Their calculus of eventual action will depend on the severity and
likelihood of each potential sanction.
3. Mandatory Standards Incorporating Moral Reasons
Law and morals mutually reinforce efforts by both the Rules and the Code
to assure integrity, for example, by incorporating the general moral prohibition
against dishonesty into much of the law of lawyering.' 9 ' This commitment to
The example assumes that a subordinate lawyer has filed a frivolous pleading (a violation of Rule 3.1).
but has filed it at the direction of a supervisor. Did the junior lawyer "know" of the pleading's character'?
If we assume that the subordinate never read the papers, but simply filed them while at the courthouse on
another matter, he should not be found guilty of violating Rule 3.1. for he had no knowledge of the
violation, and had no reason to be on inquiry. Suppose, however, that the junior lawyer read the pleading
and thought it was frivolous, but concluded that he must be in error because his supervisor would never
file a frivolous pleading. According to Rule 5.2(b). the disciplinary liability of the junior lawyer in the
second variation should depend upon whether it was "arguable" that the pleading was not frivolous. If the
pleading was clearly frivolous, the subordinate lawyer may not escape responsibility by contending that his
supervisor is responsible for both of them under Rule 5.1. That would be to say that a junior can never
"know" that his supervisor is the problem rather than the solution.
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 51, at 460.
The Code has no comparable provision. Interestingly, while the newly modified New York Code incorporates
some aspects of Rule 5.1 on the "Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer" as DR 1-104, it does not
include Rule 5.2. Special Supplement, supra note 33. This may be because Rule 5.2(a) is superfluous since DR 7-
102(A)(1) already forbids actions that "would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another" and (2)
prohibits unwarranted claims. CODE. supra note 32, DR 7-102(A)(1) and (2). This superfluity also exists under
the Rules (Rule 3.1), but Hazard and Hodes point out with regard to Rule 5.2(a):
It may have a limited independent purpose, however. A number of disciplinary cases hold that a lawyer's
junior or subordinate status may mitigate punishment if a violation is proven against him; Rule 5.2(a)
serves as a caution to junior lawyers not to misread those cases as establishing a principle of excuse, rather
than one of mitigation.
HAZARD & HonES. supra note 51, at 460.
189. Consider Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II. which, as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989), would hold the actual signer of the
pleading responsible rather than the firm. Consider also state rules, such as Rule 130 in New York. which extends
liability to the whole firm, but unlike the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II. caps liability at $10,000. N.Y.
ConDis R. & REGs.. tit. 22, §§ 130-1 (1988).
190. This may be the correct outcome from an ethical point of view even if it may occur infrequently because
of the prudential consideration raised in the text. It is to be hoped that supervising partner and associate will be
able to talk about whether a good faith claim in fact exists, aside from any tactical considerations, and whether by
signing the associate may be subjected to federal or state sanctions. Of course limited state sanctions, such as the
S10.000 cap in New York and the federal restriction to the actual signer, may limit these remedies so that they
are merely treated as a cost of doing business. See supra note 189, (Thanks to Mark Vohr for this point.)
191. In discussing the various methods for protecting client confidences when lawyers switch firms. Judge
Farnan rejected the popular "Chinese Wall" metaphor because it
tends to cast a shadow of disrepute on attorneys separated in this manner from their professional col-
leagues. The implicit assumption is that the wall, if high and thick enough, will resist an errant attorney's
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honesty is manifested in many aspects of the standards including rules that ad-
dress the lawyer's relationship to a client, 192 and the attorney's relationship to
the justice system itself.
Professional integrity is strengthened by standards that link honesty and
good practice such as Rule 8.4 which defines professional misconduct as engag-
ing "in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." 93 The
principle of honesty is also specifically incorporated into rules that govern deal-
ings with third persons' 94 and prospective clients. Thus, the Rules require com-
munications, such as advertisements giving information about a lawyer's ser-
vices, to be neither false nor misleading. 95 Once a representation has begun, the
lack of discretion, and calm public mistrust through prophylaxis.... Instead, the Court believes that the
more logically consistent, honest, and straightforward approach is to credit members of the legal profes-
sion with a certain level of integrity. This emphasis on the ethical rules themselves, rather than a pre-
sumption that they will be circumvented, should more effectively promote public respect for the bar. In
effect, the Rules enjoin the attorney to guard his client's secrets in an affirmative and deliberate manner,
through self-imposed silence. Canon 4 and Rule 1.6, which mandate maintenance of a client's confidences.
have an independent significance.
Baglini v. Pullman, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 n.I I (E.D. Pa.), aF'd. 547 F.2d 1158 (3d Cir. 1976).
192. The closest example of what amounts to an express requirement of honesty to clients may be Rule 7.1
which provides that when lawyers communicate to clients regarding their services they "shall not make a false or
misleading communication." RULES, supra note 32, Rule 7.1. This is then defined as a communication that '(a)
contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as
a whole not materially misleading; (b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can
achieve .. ." Id. at Rule 7.1(a) and (b).
193. RULES, supra note 32, Rule 8.4(d). This is substantially similar to DR 9-101 (C).
194. Rule 4.1 states: "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by
Rule 1.6 (confidentiality)." RULES, supra note 32, Rule 4.1. See supra notes 180, 183-84 for discussion of Code
and Rules with respect to balancing obligations of candor and maintaining client confidences. The Code provides
that "[i]n his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . .. kinowingly make a false statement of law or
fact." CODE. supra note 32, at DR 7-102(A)(5). The more recently and more widely adopted Rules evince a
particular concern for maintaining the integrity of the attorney by shielding lawyers from being forced into silence
about clients' past criminal fraudulent activities and involving attorneys indirectly. Thus, the authoritative com-
mentary to Rule 1.6 on maintaining confidentiality of information provides at section [15] that after a lawyer has
exercised his or her discretion to withdraw from representation when "the lawyer's services will be used by the
client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct" [14]. the lawyer may then give "notice
of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or
the like." RULES, supra note 32, Rule 1.6 (commentary). As reported supra at note 33, New York, which is a
Code state, has adopted a modification of the Code. New York's modification incorporates this approach to with-
drawal into the Code itself at DR 4-101 dealing with the preservation of confidences and secrets of a client.
(C)(5) states that a lawyer may reveal
[clonfidences or secrets to the extent implicit in withdrawing a written or oral opinion or representation
previously given by the lawyer and believed by the lawyer still to be relied upon by a third person where
the lawyer has discovered that the opinion or representation was based on materially inaccurate informa-
tion or is being used to further a crime or fraud.
Special Supplement, supra note 33. This affirmation of the need to protect lawyers from client dishonesty is
apparently in response to the notorious OPM case. See P. HEYMANN & L. LIEBMAN, supra note 80, at 184.
195. RULES, supra note 32, Rule 7.1. Comment to the Rule notes that "[w]hatever means are used to make
known a lawyer's services, statements about them should be truthful." S. GILLERS & R. SItMON. supra note 33, at
157 (emphasis added). The Code provides under DR 2-101(A) that a "lawyer shall not. . . use... any form of
public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim." CoDE, supra note 32, DR 2-101(A).
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standards may preserve integrity by permitting disassociation of the lawyer
from a client's dishonest conduct. 96
Attention to the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship is provided by
standards which infuse honesty into regulations governing such aspects of the
relationship as communications regarding fees, 97 consultation with clients as to
potential conflicts of interest, 98 and the protection of client property. 99 More-
over, the standards do not permit a lawyer to counsel a client to be dishonest by
breaking the law. 200
The significance of honesty to preserving the integrity of the justice system
itself is articulated most clearly by special requirements of candor to a tribu-
nal.201 It is also illustrated by provisions requiring lawyers to avoid even the
appearance of impropriety, including an admonition to neither state nor imply
that they are "able to influence improperly or upon irrelevant grounds any tri-
bunal, legislative body, or public official." 202
Sometimes, whether or not a particular moral standard is incorporated' 0 '
into the legal standards themselves will depend on which particular state rules
apply. In fact, since the adoption of the Model Rules, there is increasing varia-
bility among the states with regard to their ethical standards. 20 4 For example,
the dilemma of what to do about the client who has confided he committed the
crime for which an innocent person is due to die, discussed below, 205 might de-
pend on which state rules are authoritative. Thus, a lawyer practicing in Flor-
ida, Nevada or New Mexico arguably may be required by the standards them-
selves to reveal the necessary confidential information to protect the innocent
person on death row. In these three states Rule 1.6 provides an exception to the
requirement of maintaining client confidences and requires "that a lawyer shall
196. For example. Rule 1.16 allows termination of the lawyer-client relationship when (b)(1) "the client
persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or
fraudulent"; and (b)(2) "the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud." RULES, supra
note 32, Rule 1.16. Other standards link honesty to other professional requirements to strengthen professional
integrity too. Thus, Rule 8.1 on bar admission forbids making "a false statement of material fact." Id. at Rule
8.1. DR 1-101(A) is substantially the same. CODE, supra note 32, DR 1-101(A).
197. RULES, supra note 32, Rule 1.5.
198. Id. at Rule 1.7.
199. Id. at Rule 1.15.
200. Rule 1.2(d): "A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent .. ."Id. at Rule 1.2(d).
201. Rule 3.3(a)(1), "Candor Toward the Tribunal." forbids a lawyer either him or herself from making "a
false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal," and (a)(2) requires disclosure so avoid assisting a client
from committing a criminal or fraudulent act with respect to the tribunal. Id. at Rule 3.3. Moreover, Rule
3.3(a)(3) further makes the lawyer responsible for protecting the integrity of a court by requiring the lawyer "to
disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to
the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." Id. This last requirement is substantially identi-
cal to DR 7-106(B). The rest of Rule 3.3 provides additional protections.
202. CODE. supra note 32, DR 9-101(C). Essentially similar to Rules 8.4(e), 7.1(b) and 1.2(e).
203. Recently, Lerman reported instances of deception by attorneys of their clients which she claims are not
covered by the standards. Lerman, Lying To Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659. (1990). The generalizability of her
findings are highly questionable since thay are based on a sample of only twenty lawyer interviews. For a more
expansive view of what would constitute an appropriate standard for honesty, see Menkel-Meadow. Conmentary.
Lying to Clients for Econonic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment: A Proposal For a Golden Rule of Candor. 138 U.
PA. L. RLv. 761 (1990).
204. See infra note 236.
205. See infra text accompanying notes 224-25.
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reveal information necessary . .. (2) to prevent death or substantial bodily
harm to another."20 6
According to the Principle of Integrative Positivism, when the rules of
lawyering are mandatory and incorporate morals as illustrated by this section,
they constrain the behavior of both good and bad readers. For the good reader
the requirement of honesty strengthens a general disposition to be truthful. The
specifics of various provisions which seek to reinforce honesty are treated as
helpful guides for accomplishing an already accepted purpose. Thus, for exam-
ple, the constraints of Rule 1.15 on safekeeping client property are understood
to provide assistance to the lawyer as much as providing protection to the client.
Keeping a client's property and funds separate from that of the lawyer207 is a
sensible method for assuring that even honest lawyers don't make an error.
The bad reader is also constrained by such specifics because they may put
limits on opportunities for acting solely from self-interest when required to serve
as a professional fiduciary.208 Moreover, as dishonesty in the handling of client
funds becomes more readily detectable and punishment more predictable,209 bad
readers are encouraged to adhere to the honest practices demanded by the pro-
fession to avoid being sanctioned.
4. Mandatory Standards Conflicting with Some Moral Reasons
This is the category of interaction between law and morals which can pro-
vide the most difficulty for some persons in applying the Principle of Integrative
Positivism. When there is clear legal authority that mandates action incompati-
ble with personal morals, the Principle provides that the standards take prece-
dence in guiding professional decisionmaking. 10 Thus, no matter how much one
might want to warn the poor widow not to continue to do business with her
departed husband's former partner because he has defrauded her in the past, if
206. S. GILLERS & R. SIMON, supra note 33, at 39 (emphasis added). It is of interest to note that the 1979
Proposed Model Rules Draft originally provided under Rule 1.6 that "(c) A lawyer shall disclose information
about a client (I) to the extent necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that would . . . result in
wrongful detention or incarceration of a person." Id.
207. RULES, supra note 32, Rule 1.15(a). The comparable requirement of the Code is DR 9-102(A).
208. The comment to Rule 1.15(a) provides that a "'lawyer should hold property of others with the care
required of a professional fiduciary." S. GILLERS & R. SIMON, supra note 33, at 79. The recently adopted modifi-
cations to the Code in New York cabin even more narrowly the opportunities for abuse with the unusually de-
tailed provisions of DR 9-103 on "Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of Others: Fiduciary Responsibility:
Maintenance of Bank Accounts: Recordkeeping: Examination of Records . Special Supplement, supra note
33.
209. Taking a client's money without authorization, even if temporarily and with an intent to return it,
will almost always result in serious discipline. In some jurisdictions disbarment is nearly automatic. This
misconduct has become easier to detect as a result of random audits of attorney trust accounts by author-
ized state agencies.
Gu LERS & DORSEN, supra note 100, at 292.
210. This statement is not meant to foreclose the possibility of having recourse to conscientious disobedience.
See supra text accompanying notes 178-210. The point is that in terms of one's legal duty, the standards trump
personal conscience. One may still decide to act contrary to one's legal duty because of overriding moral consider-
ations. Such civil disobedience, in turn, may be perfectly consistent with the continuing legitimacy of the general
legal regime itself. Thus, Waldron points out that "a regime may be morally legitimate even though disobedience
to its law is not always wrong." Waldron, supra note 165, at 139.
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one represents the partner, the standards forbid revealing this former crime.211
Even after withdrawing from representing such a reprehensible client,21 2 one
cannot ethically reveal his prior fraud.21 3
This kind of situation presents no dilemma for the bad reader who is not
guided by independent moral considerations. In fact, in so far as the bad
reader's self-interest is tied to continued representation of the client who has
defrauded his dead partner's widow, the requirement of silence is perfectly
agreeable. However, the good reader is confronted with a dilemma. On the one
hand she may find it morally repugnant to permit her former client to continue
fleecing the widow, while on the other hand her promise of confidentiality and
loyalty prevent her either from reporting the former wrong or informing the
widow so she can protect herself from future dishonesty. This dilemma cannot
be resolved by reliance on the Normativity Principle alone. According to that
Principle, lawyers have a special moral obligation to obey the rules of their
profession. 214 However, the Principle of Integrative Positivism emphasizes that
this is a prima facie obligation which can be defeated by superior moral rea-
sons. Nonetheless, the Principle maintains the continuing legal validity of the
standard so that attorneys who become civil disobedients can be subject to sanc-
tioning for violating the law of the profession. This is the kind of situation that
leads ethicists like Simon to disavow the authority of the standards and seek to
substitute a version of discretion bridled only by the lawyer's moral
accountability.215
However, there are weighty moral reasons, aside from those embedded in
the standards themselves, for silence as much as for revelation. The information
about the fraud was obtained in the context of an attorney-client relationship
based on the promise of confidentiality. We would be shocked were a priest to
reveal a penitent's confession of having regularly stolen from the collection
plate. It would be no excuse that the sums were great and the church very poor.
Moreover, even were a stronger moral case to be made for violating the client's
confidences and hence for disobeying the standard's mandate of silence, this
does not mean that such conscientious objection can be required. Even the good
reader cannot be expected to choose civil disobedience in these kinds of situa-
tions. Such behavior may be desireable, but moral courage is something only
the self-righteous demand of all of us at all times.
What can be demanded of those who think the standards should be differ-
ent is a conscientious effort to change them. One such effort recently came to
fruition in New York. In the notorious OPM case lawyers practicing in New
211. RULES. supra note 32, Rule 1.6 and CODE, supra note 32, DR 4-101.
212. Rule 1.16 (b)(2) permits, but does not mandate such withdrawal if "'the client has used the lawyers
services to perpetrate a crime or fraud." RULES, supra note 32, Rule 1.16(b)(2). DR 2-110(C) provides for with-
drawal under the Code although it does not contain language relating to a past crime or fraud as does (b)(2).
CODL. supra note 32. DR 2-110(c). The modified New York Code has incorporated the language of Rule
1.16(b)(2) into DR 2-11I0(C)(l)(g). Special Supplement, supra note 33.
213. As comment (211 to Rule 1.6 notes '[t]he duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer rela-
tionship has terminated.- S. GILLERS & R. SIMON, supra note 33, at 35.
214. See supra text accompanying note 163.
215. Simon 1988, supra note 11.
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York in the 1970s and 80s had no way under the Code to entirely disentangle
themselves from an ongoing fraud committed by their clients.21 Were a similar
situation to arise today, the lawyers would, under the recently modified New
York Code, at least be able to withdraw a representation by them which was
materially inaccurate or which might contribute to a continuing fraud by the
client.2"' Such revelation, however, is permitted218 and not mandatory. In decid-
ing how to use their discretion in such circumstances, lawyers should apply the
kind of reasons for action analysis called for by the Principle of Integrative
Positivism219 and illustrated in the final section.
D. Reasons for Action
Integrity depends on the reasons which determine the legal actor's ac-
tions.2"' Thus, for example, an attorney may be appointed to appeal the convic-
tion of an indigent criminal defendant and may refuse to argue all the potential
claims his client proposes to raise. As the Supreme Court has held,221 a lawyer
is not required to raise all the issues on appeal which a client wishes to have
argued, but may exercise discretion so long as he does not do so for the wrong
reasons. Such wrong reasons would include the lawyer acting out of "a strong
interest in having judges and prosecutors think well of him, and, if he is work-
ing for a flat fee-a common arrangement for criminal defense attorneys-or if
his fees for court appointments are lower than he would receive for other work,
[so that] he has an obvious financial incentive to conclude cases on his criminal
docket swiftly. '2 22 On the other hand, the attorney acts for the right reasons if
his decision is based on the judgment that the "mind of an appellate judge is
habitually receptive to the suggestion that a lower court committed an error.
But receptiveness declines as the number of assigned errors increases. Multiplic-
ity hints at lack of confidence in any one . ...
The good reader engaged in practical reason chooses to act on good reasons
for action. But there may be situations where good legal and moral reasons exist
for conflicting actions. In such circumstances, integrity requires the good reader
to carefully balance the respective moral and legal reasons and to act as indi-
216. P. HEYMANN & L. LIEBMAN, supra note 80.
217. The modification of DR 4-101. "Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client." provides at
(C)(5) that a lawyer may reveal "[c]onfidences or secrets to the extent implicit in withdrawing a written or oral
opinion or representation previously given by the lawyer and believed by the lawyer still to be relied upon by a
third person where the lawyer has discovered that the opinion or representation was based on materially inaccu-
rate information or is being used to further a crime or fraud." Special Supplement, supra note 33.
218. DR 4-101 (C): "A lawyer may reveal .... ." Id. at S-10 (emphasis added).
219. "(6) Individual attorneys must decide for themselves when, if ever, disobedience is morally warranted.
(7) In doing so they should engage in a reasons for action analysis." See supra text accompanying note 38.
220. Admittedly, stated reasons may not represent the "true" reasons for action; however, the integrity thesis
does not claim to present a theory of motivation. Moreover, as emphasized earlier, the proposed analysis is ad-
dressed to lawyers of good character who honestly seek to reflect on what course of action is warranted under the
circumstances of their situation. For attorneys of bad character, the law of lawyering must rely on coercion.
221. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (Defense counsel assigned to prosecute an appeal from a criminal
conviction has no constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant.).
222. Id. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting).




cated by the stronger reasons. For example, a favorite hypothetical in teaching
about professional ethics is to pose the dilemma of representing a client who
confesses that he actually committed the murder for which another person is
soon to be executed.22 4 Because of the special circumstance of representing this
criminal client, one has the legal duty to keep his confession confidential. At the
same time, lawyers, by virtue of being morally autonomous persons, also have
the moral duty to prevent the death of an innocent person.22 5 For anyone
else-except a priest and, perhaps, a parent-knowledge of this confession
presents no dilemma. Thus, if a lawyer overhears this confession while sitting in
a bar, moral and legal reasons all cut in the same direction. The lawyer is free
to report what was overheard; she is also free both morally and legally to re-
main silent. Assuming the lawyer unsuccessfully tried everything possible to
persuade her client to share this information with the proper authorities and
save the innocent person about to be executed, she now confronts conflicting
moral and legal reasons for action.226
Conflicting reasons for action arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to
other people generally and to a client by virtue of the special circumstance of
being a lawyer. The lawyer must choose among these reasons those with the
greater weight in order to decide whether to keep this confession confidential or
to reveal it. Either act may be ethical. If there were some clear moral duty to
report the confession and no room within the standards to do so, then attorneys
would be faced with the classic problem that may result in civil disobedience.
Equally problematic would be a situation in which revelation would be required
by the law of lawyering but would violate a moral obligation that superseded
any legal reason for reporting the confession.
In fact, there are good moral and legal reasons available to support either
silence or disclosure. Preserving client confidences because of the promise of
loyalty is a good moral reason for maintaining one's silence. Such an action can
readily find legal support in the confidentiality provisions of the professional
standards. 227 Under the facts of this unusual and extremely troubling hypotheti-
cal, revealing client confidences in order to save an innocent life obviously can
224. For example, one well-known casebook in legal ethics poses the question:
A lawyer assigned to represent an indigent criminal defendant charged with homicide learns, in the course
of questioning the defendant and preparing the defense, that the client had committed another homicide
for which an innocent person has been convicted. The convicted person has been sentenced to death and
her appeal is pending before the state supreme court, What, if anything, should or must the lawyer do?
Gti I RS & DORSEN, supra note 100, at 392. The Hazard and Koniak casebook has a particularly good discussion
of the problem. See HAZARD AND KONIAK supra note 10, at 294-310.
225. This does not mean that lawyers and others are required to intervene when riding the subway when
another passenger is threatened by a gunman. Such an intervention would be a morally good thing to do, but we
are allowed to forego doing that which is moral when prudential reasons like preserving our own lives are also at
issue. We don't even need such a dramatic excuse as self-preservation to excuse failure to act since many morally
right acts are, in fact, supererogatory. more than can be expected morally of most persons.
226. This particular problem is typical of the kind of extreme dilemma often used in teaching about profes-
sional ethics. Such dilemmas may have heuristic value-they may facilitate teaching about thinking about ethics.
However, they have the serious cost of treating extreme instances of practice as paradigmatic and may contribute
to the appeal of role theory. Most lawyers probably never actually face this kind of dilemma in the course of a
lengthy legal career.
227. RULES, supra note 32, Rule 1.6, and CODE, supra note 32. DR 4-101.
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:551
be justified morally. Support for this decision can also be located in the stan-
dards of the profession, but less readily.
For example, the purpose underlying the exception to confidentiality for
future crimes is clearly to prevent serious harm to third parties. 28 Even if al-
lowing an innocent person to die may not be a crime, if the purpose of the
confidentiality exception is to prevent future serious harm to the innocent, 229
one may want to implement the more general legal principle by an expansive
interpretation of the crime requirement. Moreover, as argued earlier,23 the un-
derlying jurisprudence of the standards is sufficiently flexible and permissive to
228. RuLES. supra note 32, Rule 1.6(b)(1). A counterargument to this view might be that the language of
the Rule is very narrowly crafted to require reasonable belief on the part of the lawyer that the client will commit
a crime likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. Silence in allowing someone else to die for a
murder you committed, is not actually killing another person. The state is the agent of the innocent person's
death. However, if such silence is arguably some sort of less serious crime, can the lawyer's revelation be justified
by the limited language of the present rule? Hazard and Hodes provide an excellent analysis of the legal and
moral issues involved. They point out that there is a "strong presumption of nondisclosure" and that the exception
for imminent death or substantial bodily harm merely permits
lawyers to balance harms in what was essentially a moral dialogue with themselves. Everyone agreed that
a code of conduct must at least permit lawyers to reveal a planned murder, for a prohibition of such
disclosure would be wholly unacceptable on moral grounds. There was similar agreement concerning a
planned bodily assault. The basic dispute therefore simply came down to whether the profession should
prohibit disclosure in situations one step less serious [such as serious fraud]. By permitting disclosure in
situations of serious fraud, the Proposed Final Draft would have forced lawyers to make a moral judgment
in each such case, balancing the important present and future "payoff" of the confidentiality rule against
the immediate harm to the intended victim. The moral position of the profession in society would also
have been weighed in the balance. Under the proposed Rule. a lawyer who had mere knowledge of im-
pending client frauds, but did nothing to stop them, could not have been disciplined. However, he would
have to accept moral responsibility both for himself and his brothers and sisters at the Bar. In amending
Rule 1.6(b)(1). the ABA House of Delegates narrowed the exception to its minimum defensible core, took
away the lawyer's discretion, and predisposed of the moral issue. The command of this provision is now
clear, especially given the history just recounted: lawyers who have knowledge of an impending client
fraud, and who cannot plausibly be charged with participation or facilitation . . . must suffer in silence.
Although the present text reflects a laudable desire to minimize the exceptions to confidentiality, it goes
too far. Many lawyers will chafe under a rule that promises to punish them if they do what they know is
morally right. The public, when it understands the implications of the final version of this exception, will
deride the profession once again-this time with great justification-for imperiously decreeing that its
"ethics" supersede prevailing notions of morality. This overly narrow exception has already caught the eye
of the press, which has decried it as an expression of the "hired gun- mentality. A sound exception, of
course, should not go to the other extreme and require disclosure. The confidentiality principle has its own
claim to moral force, and it should only be outweighed when the potential harm is clear and present, as
well as serious. The Proposed Final Draft had it right: the intermediate cases should be left to the consci-
entious judgment of the responsible lawyer on the scene.
HAZARD & HoDES, supra note 51. at 102-03. But cf. New Jersey RPC 1.6 which both requires revelation at (b).
"shall reveal." and includes "substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another" as a basis. NAT.
RiP. LEGA. ETmcs & PROF. RKsP., vol. Il (1990).
229. Another plausible analysis of this problem would be to treat the confidence that my client is prepared to
let an innocent person die for the murder he has committed as not a matter of protection of information about
past crimes but as an occasion to make me an accessory to the future death of another person. Prevention of
serious future bodily harm to others is arguably permitted by the standards themselves. For example. Rule 1.6 at
(b)(1) permits a lawyer to reveal confidential information "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death .. . .- RULES, supra note 32. Rule 1.6(b)(1). It is
not clear, of course, whether the criminal client's silence violates a criminal law in the particular jurisdiction in
question. Some may claim that revelation of the confidence makes the lawyer responsible for her own client's
death, but this is specious. The client created his liability by his prior murder. This analysis is analogous to
Luban's excellent treatment of the perjurious client who simply has no right to the assistance of his lawyer in
telling a lie. LAWYERS AND JUSTICE. supra note 5. at 201.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 178-85.
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allow room for overriding moral concerns in certain limited circumstances, of
which this is arguably one. Thus, the standards, when read as a whole, may
provide support for the decision to reveal by reference to the Code provision at
DR 1-102(B) that a "lawyer shall not: (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice" or "(6) Engage in any other conduct that ad-
versely reflects on his fitness to practice law." Arguably, permitting an innocent
person to die for a murder committed by one's client undermines the very foun-
dation of what constitutes justice and would certainly vitiate an attorney's "re-
sponsibility [to stand] 'as a shield' . . in defense of right and to ward off
wrong. 231
Of course, lawyers who give greater weight to reasons which support their
duty to protect innocent life and choose to reveal their client's confession should
inform their client of their decision and resign from the representation.2 32 Sub-
sequently, some of them may even be disciplined by an authoritative committee
of their peers for this decision. Such a committee can weigh these duties differ-
ently than the attorneys, and the lawyers must be prepared to suffer the conse-
quences of such a difference in opinion about the right course of action to
take.233 It is also possible that their peers will vindicate their choice. 34 Those
231. Commentary to DR 1-102, SELECTED STATUTES, supra note 60, at 8 n.14 (1989). Rule 8.4 also includes
in its definition of misconduct at (d) engaging "in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."
RULES. supra note 32, Rule 8.4.
232. The eventual consequences for the client as well as the innocent person on death row remain unclear
even if the defending attorney reveals the confession. The confession itself is not likely to be admissible evidence in
either a subsequent investigation or trial for murder of the confessing client because of the attorney-client privi-
lege. Spahn, Making and Breaking the Attorney-Client Privilege, 35 PRAC. LAW. 65 (Jan. I, 1989). Whether or
not the governor will pardon the innocent on death row will depend on many factors out of the control of the
revealing attorney.
233. As indicated earlier, if found guilty of a violation of the rules of the profession, lawyers can be disci-
plined by sanctions ranging from a private reprimand by a disciplinary committee to disbarment, which generally
involves an indefinite or permanent exclusion from the bar. See supra text accompanying note 146. Of course, as
also indicated earlier, since the bar has been notoriously delinquent in exercising its disciplinary powers, see supra
note 148 and accompanying text, it is unlikely that it would do so in these circumstances. Moreover, it could be
argued that good reasons for action should constitute a mitigating factor in decisions about appropiate sanctions
for misconduct. Good character, reputation and lack of a prior record already serve to mitigate punishment.
ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL. PROF. CONDUCT. 101:3201 (1986). However, it remains the essence of civil disobedi-
ence that it may be morally required although it both demands exceptional courage to undertake and resolution to
endure its penalties. In this Luban and I are generally in agreement. He writes:
Professional ethics can tell a lawyer not to cut corners; my point is that it cannot tell her to cut throats.
When moral obligation conflicts with professional obligation, the lawyer must become a civil disobedient.
(And yes: if the professional obligations are part of an enforceable code, the lawyer may have to run the
risks of other civil disobedients.)
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE. supra note 5. at 156.
234. One approach to arguing for such vindication might utilize what are essentially reasons for action pro-
posed by Professor Simon in his 1988 article. For example, Simon uses the notorious Valdez case, developed by G.
BELtLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS 586-91 (1978) to demonstrate how his theory might be
applied. In the scenario, provided both on videotape and in the book. Mr. and Mrs. Valdez have brought a tort
action for the wrongful death of their son. They are represented by an inexperienced attorney who has not done
sufficient research either to find out about a crucial change in the law from contributory to comparative negligence
nor to determine that a key witness has recalled information that would be critical to the success of his clients'
case. The defending insurance company is represented by an experienced negotiator, aware of both these issues.
and the question raised by Simon is whether or not the insurance company attorney should disclose the change in
the law. This is a problem that raises no issue with respect to the application of the Normativity Principle since
the Code and Rules currently provide minimal constraint as to the negotiation role and the change in law is not a
client confidence. Simon argues that
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who read the professional standards as mandating confidentiality, trumping all
other considerations rather than a prima facie obligation, missed the debate on
the perjurious client.13 5
IV. CONCLUSION
Role-differentiation critics have mistakenly postulated a "standard concep-
tion of lawyering" that does not permit lawyers to be persons of integrity. The
critics have debated the wrong question by applying role theory rather than the
four elements analysis to the fact that persons who are attorneys may make
different moral decisions depending on whether or not they are functioning as
lawyers. Of course lawyers can be good persons; what matters is whether or not
they act for the right reasons in the special circumstance of serving as an
attorney.
the critical concern for the defense lawyer should be whether the settlement likely to occur in the absence
of disclosure would be fair (in the sense that it reasonably vindicates the merits of the relevant claims).
On the facts given, it seems probable that the settlement would not be fair. The plaintiffs lawyer probably
set her [this rote use of the female pronoun is confusing since in the videotape and script the lawyer is
male] bottom line well below the appropriately discounted value of the plaintiffs claims because of her
mistake about the law. Here the defense counsel's responsibility is to move the case toward a fair result.
and the best way to do this is probably to make the disclosure [of the change in law] and resume the
negotiation.
Simon 1988, supra note II, at 1099. Later Simon provides an excellent characterization of this proposition in
terms of a reason for action: "[W]ithout disclosure the plaintiff will be deprived of a substantive legal entitlement
to recover for negligently inflicted losses." Id. at 1114. This would be a reason for the act of disclosure whose force
is strengthened by reference to the professional standards' requirement of disclosure to a tribunal of "legal author-
ity in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel." RULES. supra note 32. Rule 3.3(a)(3). DR 7-106(B)(1) is substantially identical.
If the case went to court, the defense lawyer would be required to disclose. Since this case will never get to court
and since there is so little supervision of the negotiation process, the attorneys arc all the more obligated to protect
the fairness of the process. One way to do so is to protect the integrity of that process in ways similar to those
protections provided for adjudication. This concern for the substantive purpose to be served is similar to the
analysis above arguing that revelation of the confession is justified because it serves to protect the integrity of the
administration of justice. As Simon correctly points out, his analysis is consistent with examining legal reasons for
action and need not invoke moral reasons. Simon 1988, supra note II, at 1114. Simon acknowledges that "the
distinction between legal and nonlegal commitment has some importance in delimiting the sphere of the discre-
tionary approach, since the approach does not address decision making involving nonlegal commitments." Id. In
contrast, the integrity thesis provides a means for considering the entire range of reasons for action-legal, moral,
prudential, etc.
235. See supra notes 183-84. Of course, there are those who would argue that perjury is the exception that
proves the rule. The protection of confidences about past crimes does allow for only very narrow exceptions under
the Code (i.e. those states that do not nullify the constraints of DR 7-102(B) (permits revelation of past fraud
when the client refuses to do so to the affected person or tribunal) with the added phrase "except when the
information is protected as a privileged communication.") The standards of the profession, however, do not func-
tion like some monolithic structure guiding the practices of lawyers in all fifty states. Particularly since the devel-
opment of the Model Rules in 1983. states have modified both Code and Rules to craft a range of approaches to
such central concerns as confidentiality. For example. Model Rule 1.6(b) provides:
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (I) to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm: or (2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
RutES. supra note 32. Rule 1.6(b). However. states like Arizona, Arkansas. Connecticut. Indiana, and Wyoming.
although they have enacted the substance of the Model Rule, have expanded Rule 1.6(b)(1) to cover additional
crimes. NAT'L REP. LEGAL ETHICS & PROF. REsP.. supra note 228.
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The critics' arguments from moral nonaccountability and partisanship both
fail. In fact, as the Boundaries Principle demonstrates, it would be morally
wrong to hold lawyers morally accountable for the acts of their clients because
doing so is disrespectful of the moral autonomy of both the attorneys and those
they have promised to serve.
The integrity thesis demonstrates that the correct standard conception of
lawyering provides ample opportunity for attorneys to integrate their responsi-
bilities to the profession and their own cherished moral values. Lawyers, as the
Normativity Principle holds, have a special obligation to obey the law of lawyer-
ing but, as the Principle of Integrative Positivism maintains, this is a prima
facie obligation only. Lawyers remain responsible for balancing their legal and
moral obligations for themselves and may conscientiously decide to disobey the
law of lawyering so long as their reasons for doing so are good reasons.

